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APPENDIX
ABSTRACT
The human brain has developed mechanisms to estimate future internal and external
events utilizing previous experiences. Based on predictive processing of information, appropri-
ate cognitive resources can be available for goal-oriented behavior, to expedite the recognition
and interpretation of critical stimuli and events, generate and select appropriate action alterna-
tives, and adjust behavior to the environmental demands. A large body of evidence supports the
predictive nature of cognitive processing across different domains: vision (Friston, 2005) and
attention (Mehta & Schaal, 2002; Enns & Lleras, 2008), motor control (Wolpert & Flanagan,
2001), action understanding (Jeannerod, 2001; Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007; Kilner, Vargas,
Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2007), language (DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005), music (Keller
and Koch, 2008), executive functions (Fuster, 2001; Wylie et al., 2006), and theory of mind
(Frith and Frith, 2006). Evidence from studies on sensory and sensory-motor activity suggests
that prediction modulates neuronal activity through reducing activation thresholds and/or in-
creasing the signal-to-noise ratios, facilitating subsequent stimulus processing (for review, see
Gomez et al 2004). Similarly, prediction is crucial to create a stable representation of the envi-
ronment (Kveraga Boshyan, & Bar, 2007; Rolfs, Jonikaitis, Deubel, & Cavanagh, 2011), to iden-
tify action sequences (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002), and to determine others’ intentions
(Frith & Frith, 2006).
The aim of the three studies was to examine how higher-order predictions about others’
actions influence participants’ orienting of attention to gaze cues in a relatively complex social
scenario. To define the framework for the series of studies, a review of the ubiquity of prediction
mechanisms in the human brain will be presented; along with the basic models proposed to ac-
count for predictive processing in sensory, motor, and – importantly – social domains. Addi-
 tionally, details about the relevance of the gaze in the social context, the orienting by the gaze
and the relationship between gaze following and action sequences will be discussed. Subse-
quently, two chapters present three studies designed to disclose predictive processing of others’
actions (or action goals) being at work in a naturalistic social scenario. The studies showed that
expectations regarding action goals affected shared attention, as evidenced by gaze-cueing ef-
fects: when the gaze behavior of an observed actor violated observers’ expectations, which were
based on their understanding of the action context, gaze cueing effects were reduced or even
completely eliminated. These effects are due to covert (rather than overt) attentional orienting
to goal-congruent vs. -incongruent objects. Further evidence from eye tracking and EEG/ERPs
reveals the brain mechanism involved in these processes. In the General Discussion, these find-
ings are described in the context of prediction mechanisms. Further theoretical implications re-
garding social attention, theory of mind, and general interactions between low-level and higher-
order cognitive mechanisms are considered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Introduction  2
1.1 Predictive processing of the brain
The idea of predictive brain has gaining strength in the recent years. Increasing evi-
dence suggest that predictive processing is inherent to all levels of our hierarchically orga-
nized neural system (Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010). For the first time in history of
cognitive psychology predictive processing models promise to bring cognition, perception,
action, and attention together within a common framework (Clark, 2013). In general, this ap-
proach suggests the probability-density distributions induced by hierarchical generative
models as our basic means of representing the world, and prediction-error minimization as
the driving force behind learning, action-selection, recognition, and inference. 
Various models have been proposed for the mechanisms underlying predictive pro-
cessing in the brain. However, two main models have been widely investigated: forward mod-
els, and the theory of predictive coding. Forward models aimed initially to explain how the
internal prediction mechanisms contribute significantly to motor control (Miall & Wolpert,
1996; Jaennerod, 2001; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003;
Schubotz, 2007). These models suggest that predictions about the future states of the body
are generated by emulations of musculoskeletal system dynamics using internal models. In
detail, the motor system uses an ‘efference copy’ of the formulated motor command to pro-
duce (internal model-based) predictions of the sensory feedback; the sensory effects of the
motor action. When the action is executed, predictions are compared with the sensory inputs
to determine whether they match the anticipated effects. Comparison of results updates the
model to increase the accuracy of predictions. The extensive application of the models have
been proved for explaining prediction in other cognitive domains, including higher-order
mechanisms, such as social cognition and theory of mind (Wolpert et al., 2003). Further-
more, Schubotz and von Cramon (2003) suggested a joint sensorimotor forward model which
unifies the perceptual and motor models. Motivated by findings that show links between the
motor system and perceptual processing, this model postulates that the brain can predict
both motor and perceptual processes, regardless of whether such constitute sensory conse-
quences of one’s own actions or expected sensory stimuli. The model assumes that mecha-
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nisms that emulate future states in both domains use the same computations, without con-
sidering both models as identical. In detail, motor processing requires lower accuracy predic-
tions compared to perceptual processing, given that the systems rely on relational properties
of external events. Thus, forward models have proven a considerable explanatory power that
transcend its original purpose, offering valuable insights into the fundamental mechanisms
of the Bayesian brain.
Figure 1A. Prediction in motor control.
Similarly, initially conceived for explaining the visual processing, the ‘predictive cod-
ing’ framework proposes that information flowing forward through a hierarchy of sensory re-
gions is met at each stage by a top-down ‘prediction’ projected back from the layer immedi-
ately above (Friston, 2005). Sensory information flows through different levels in the visual
cortex, a hierarchically organized structure (see Figure A2). Each level processes and com-
pares sensory information with predictions transmitted through backward connections. The
model postulates that when the sensory information and prediction do not converge, a ‘pre-
diction error’ is detected and fed forward. After several repetitions of this process, such pre-
diction errors update expectations across the different levels, leading to a progressive de-
crease in the prediction error at subsequent levels. Prediction errors might increase neural
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activity, reflecting attempts of the brain to update predictions and maintain stability in the
representation of the environment (Friston & Stephan, 2007). This is made by integrating
top-down expectancies with bottom-up information across multiple levels of processing
(Friston, 2005). 
Figure A2. Schematic presentation of predictive coding in visual perception. Via iterative in-
teractions, expected and observed information are reconciled within a hierarchically organized sensory system.
Red arrows represent forward prediction error, black arrows represent backward predictions. Information
travels from primary to higher association cortex (yellow circles). The main elements are two main types of
cells, representation units (R) which encode expectations about what is possible or likely in the coming sensory
world; and error units (E) driven by sensory input from the preceding layer of the hierarchy (red solid). Predic-
tions are ‘subtracted’ from error unit responses –surprising events elicit larger neuronal responses. Represen-
tation unit predictions are updated on the basis of the mismatch between expected and observed information.
Local circuit interactions (dashed arrows) occurring via many interactions between individual nodes subtract
and update predictions. Resultant predictions in turn are used as priors for the preceding layer (black arrows).
Importantly, the proposal of co-existing representational and error neuron popula-
tions provides a natural account for the observation that cortical responses scale with sensory
surprise: when stimulation confirms expectations, error neuron activity will be minimal, but
when sensory evidence diverges from predictions, error units will respond vigorously. In con-
clusion, predictive coding and forward models postulate that the brain is regarded as an in-
ference machine that follows Bayesian principles, constantly building models of internal and
external events so as to predict future states (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston and Stephan,
2007). Collectively, predictions play a crucial role in the information processing, not only
guide cognition and behavior actively –matching expected incoming events and evaluating
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the accuracy of our expectations– but also actively updating those predictions by preferen-
tially selecting corresponding features in the environment. 
1.1.1 Prediction brain structures
Different parts of the brain have been associated with predictive processing, specifi-
cally different sensory cortices (occipital, parietal and dorso-lateral), the motor system (pre-
motor cortex), the cerebellum, the frontal cortex (orbitofrontal, medial frontal and dorsolat-
eral cortex), insula, and subcortical structures (like thalamus, basal ganglia, and amygdala)
(See Table 1 for functions associated with different regions). This shows that different aspects
of prediction can be localized across the whole brain or nervous system, each of the structures
playing a distinct role. Therefore, it is important not only to associate brain areas with predic-
tive processing, but also to specidy the type of predictive processing they are related to. 
Table 1A. Predictive brain. Areas involved with prediction following reported fndings.
Prediction related function Brain structure 
Prediction on longer timescales (Eichenbaum and
Fortin, 2009; Lisman and Redish, 2009)
Prefrontal cortex: medial temporal regions, espe-
cially the hippocampus
Imagining the future as well as remembering the past
(Schacter et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2009)
Posterior cerebral cortices: including the lateral
parietal and temporal regions, the precuneus and
the retrosplenial cortex.
Planning (Fuster, 2001); formulating temporal expec-
tations (Coull and Nobre, 2008; Coull, 2009)
Parietal cortices together with
premotor regions 
Predictive motor processing (Schultz and Dickinson,
2000; Fleischer, 2007; Kotz et al., 2009)
Basal ganglia 
Reward prediction (Knutson and Cooper, 2005) Ventral striatum
Pain or emotional processing (Ploghaus et al., 1999;
Porro et al., 2003; Ueda et al., 2003)
Amygdala, insula and the anterior cingulate cortex
Inferring others’ intentions and mental states (e.g.,
Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2006; Adolphs,
1999; Brothers, 1990; Frith & Frith, 2006). 
A network consisting of medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), fusiform
gyrus (FG), amygdala and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) 
1.2 Prediction of others’ behavior
From having a conversation to playing sports, we attend to people’s movements, facial
expressions, and language, to anticipate others’ mental states and intentions. These interac-
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tions are all embedded in an environment, usually involving objects, spatial arrangements
and temporal restrictions, that should be taken into account for successful social interactions.
For instance, background knowledge about the context of an observed action enables under-
standing and predicting others’ action goals, intentions, as well as bodily and mental states
(Frith & Frith, 2006). The following paragraphs will explore in more detail how predictive
mechanisms in the brain are deployed (1) action understanding and prediction, (2) inferring
mental states, and (3) spatial perspective taking.
1.2.1 Action understanding and prediction 
Predicting where and how people are going to move is highly relevant in social inter-
actions, allowing to anticipate bodily postures based on current states (Verfaillie & Daems,
2002), and to determine whether an action is intended or unintended (Grezes, Frith, & Pass-
ingham, 2004; Wolpert et al., 2003). Realizing all these functions involves rapid prediction of
successive steps in action sequences. In order to successfully predict events and action se-
quences, actions need to be correctly identified. Recognition of action sequences is thought to
be based on matching perceived actions onto corresponding action representations stored in
semantic memory (Jeannerod, 2006). Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, and Sirigu (2004)
showed that an electrocortical readiness potential (RP)¹, commonly taken to reflect motor
preparation processes, also manifested during mere action observation – and, importantly,
before the action was actually performed by the observed actor. This indicates that motor
preparation can be elicited by the mere anticipation of successive action events, rather than
being based solely on the active preparation of a motor (re-)action. These results shed light
on the mechanisms involved in action understanding, that is: mechanisms mapping an ob-
served action onto an action representation in the observer’s cognitive system. 
According to Schubotz and von Cramon (2002), each action sequence has a ‘syntax’: a
basic schedule that is fixed and mandatory (though tolerating some level of flexibility). There
is evidence suggesting that observing actions triggers a corresponding action schema in the
¹ RP is observed at electrodes over motor cortex, typically C3/4, characterized by a more negative deflection 
over sites contralateral vs. ipsilateral to a manual response (see Eimer, 1998; Eimer & Coles, 2003; Gratton, 
Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1988; Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1986).
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observer, including a goodness-of-fit evaluation between the observed action and the action
schema (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). An action schema can be described on two lev-
els: the goal of the action (see, e.g., Hamilton & Grafton, 2007) and its implementation, with
the latter defined by the actor’s movements and the objects involved (Manthey, Schubotz, &
von Cramon, 2003). For an action schema to be triggered, at least one of the two components
of implementation must be observable: the relevant objects and/or movements. Moreover,
one more element is crucial for the activation of an action schema: the aim of the action.
Goal-directed actions follow a largely predefined pattern: a coherent sequence of steps, which
makes actions relatively predictable (Schubotz & von Cramon, 2002). Wurm & Schubotz
(2012) showed how the compatibility between actions and action context modulates action
recognition. When participants were asked to identify an action performed either in a com-
patible (i.e. squeezing lemons in the kitchen), incompatible (i.e. squeezing lemons in the
bathroom) or neutral context (i.e. squeezing lemons with a empty white background). They
found that participants were 100 ms slower recognizing incompatible contexts relative to
compatible. Interestingly, action compatible contexts did not facilitate action recognition, as
neutral and compatible conditions showed no differences. Additionally, neural responses
recorded with fMRI showed an increased activation in the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
only for incompatible contexts. Altogether, authors suggests that response delays may reflect
the attempt to resolve a conflict between the observed action and context. Identify an action
requires to embed the action step into an overarching action compatible with the provided
context, possible by the activation of the left prefrontal cortex.
During action observation humans implicitly generate inferences about the intentions
and goals that are associated with the movements (Wolpert et al., 2003). Such predictions
are produced at the beginning of the movements and are tested by predicting how the move-
ment will proceed. Violations of expectations regarding other’s actions elicit increased activi-
ty in posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) consistent with the notion that this region has
a special role in reading intentions from movements. STS codes for biological movements,
such as head direction, pointing gestures and in particular gaze direction, with eye gaze being
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the most important source for inferring the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith
& Frith, 2006, for review). Numerous studies coincide with the crucial role of pSTS in the de-
tection of unexpected movements (Pelphrey et al., 2003 and 2005; Saxe et al., 2004; Grezes
et al., 2004; Senju et al., 2005, 2008; Tipples et al., 2012). In addition, the STS is also in-
volved in face perception via its connections with the fusiform gyrus (Haxby, Hoffman &
Gobbini, 2000, 2002; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000), in addition to the ‘mirror-neuron system’
(Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Umilta et al., 2001; see Rizzolatti & Craighero,
2004, for review). Reciprocal projections have also been found between the STS and the
amygdala, a structure of the limbic system involved in the processing of facial expressions
and emotional content of perceived information (Aggleton, Burton, & Passingham, 1980; Ag-
gleton, 1993; Thomas et al., 2001). In sum, evidence suggest that specialized brain mecha-
nisms generate expectations about other’s behavior, and in addition, there are highly sensi-
tive mechanisms that confirm or revoke such expectations. 
1.2.2 Inferring mental states
Consider another person’s mental perspective and predict what they can know con-
tributes to humans ability to anticipate others’ behavior. This requires to understand that
people’s actions are the result of the interaction between their own desires, knowledge, goals,
and beliefs with the actual state of the world. This ability is a powerful skill and is referred as
mentalising (Frith and Frith, 2003). Mentalising can be deployed in real or imaginary scenar-
ios, experienced or novel situations, when behavior is observed, read about or illustrated
(Frith & Frith, 2006). Nonetheless, this ability has been investigated with hypothetical situa-
tions. Participants are exposed to enacted, read or depicted stories and asked to either ex-
plain protagonists’ actions or infer their thoughts, feelings and intentions. 
Using this type of paradigm, different studies aimed to examine and characterize the
cognitive mechanisms that play a role in mentalising. Firstly, increased activation in pSTS
has been associated with bottom-up effects in mentalising tasks. Viewers seem to readily at-
tribute emotions, desires and false beliefs to animated cartoons and abstract shapes with hu-
man like movements, in contrast to animations showing random or mechanical movements
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(Heider and Simmel, 1944). Activation recorded during these tasks, revealed robust increases
in activity in pSTS along with lesser increases in a number of brain areas including medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Castelli, Happé, Frith & Frith, 2000; Martin and Weisberg, 2003).
Elicited activation remained the same even when participants were informed that the move-
ments could be intentional or randomized. Secondly, increased activation in MPFC has been
associated with top–down effects in mentalising tasks. MPFC elicited higher activation when
participants believed that they were interacting with a person relative to when they believed
they were interacting with a pre-programmed agent. This pattern has been elicited consis-
tently during competitive (Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002), trust (McCabe et al.,
2001) or economic games (Rilling et al.,2004). Taken together, studies consistently reported
activation in the MPFC and the pSTS (Frith and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004). These brain
areas seem to be closely related with mentalising.
Importantly, humans, among other primates, carefully attend counterparts’ faces to
read out information about others’ interest and intentions. A special skill of remembering,
identifying and interpreting faces might be facilitated for different physical and environmen-
tal conditions (for review see Emery, 2000). Attending to gaze direction and facial expres-
sions (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000) provides important clues for inferring others’
mood, interests, and, most importantly, for predicting others’ intentions (e.g., Emery, 2000;
Frith and Frith, 2006; Itier & Batty, 2009). This skill is acquired in the first months of life
and play a crucial role in establishing social bonding and attachment. Studies revealed that
even infants can identify and follow faces (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998; Vecera & Johnson,
1995). Also, along the lifespan, most people spend more time looking at faces than at any oth-
er type of objects (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). For social interaction perceiving faces
is critical: it provides information about others, as well as hints to infer others’ mood, inter-
ests and intentions. 
1.2.3 Perspective taking 
Another important factor that helps to predict behavior is the ability to appreciate an-
other person’s point of view. Once the other’s perspective is reached we are able to respond to
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the actions of others and therefore able to predict goals, interpret other’s intentions and be-
liefs, and even pursue mutual aims (Baron-Cohen, 1995), and this is essential to reason about
other’s mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Allocentric perception is required for so-
cial interactions and it is easily assumed when required. This was showed in a study of Tver-
sky & Hard (2009). Participants were asked to describe the spatial relations of items in a
video which included (or not) a person who could be presented as a passive element of the
scene or performing an action. They found that percentages of responses using allocentric
perception increased when there was a person in the scene, and he increase was significantly
higher when the person was performing an action. In other words, once there is another hu-
man included in the context, observers spontaneously took other’s perspective. Taking the
other’s perspective was boosted by observing an intended action. Such evidence is consistent
with a another study that reports that actions at the disposal of another agent had an impact
on one’s own actions, even when the task at hand did not require taking the actions of anoth-
er person into account (Sebanz et al., 2003). Both studies revealed that humans are prone to
take others’ perspective, which might facilitate understanding other’s intentions and goals.
Interestingly, a recent study (Bukowski, Hietanen, & Samson, 2015) showed that the
mere presence of the other person is not sufficient to trigger the computation of where/what
that person is looking at. Participants were asked to perform a gaze-cueing task or a visual
perspective taking (VPT) task, both including an avatar in the screen. They found that
whether participants’ attention is drawn to the person in the first place is context-dependent.
Participants attended to the other person in the VPT; whereas they attended to external fac-
tors in the gaze cueing task. This has two main implications: first, deployment of attention is
partially stimulus-driven and hence not fully automatic; and, second, the social mind-set cre-
ated by the task goal determines where the attentional resources are allocated. Therefore, au-
thors suggested that dependent on the task, narrowing down attention to the other person
prevents competition from other potential sources of attentional capture or orienting. Simi-
larly, non-social (attentional) factors might help prioritizing attention to the other person
and trigger the computation of where and what the other person is looking at. 
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1.2.4 Gaze-based shared attention and prediction
Importantly, social interaction is embedded in an environment, objects and events are
located in a particular location and are relevant in a particular situation. Therefore, monitor-
ing where others attend is a crucial means for understanding and predicting events in social
interactions. Based on the ability to attend where others attend, shared attention is a rudi-
mentary mechanism underlying social cognition (Baron-Cohen, 1995). There is ample evi-
dence that humans follow the gaze direction of others (e.g., Driver et al., 1999; Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999; Langton & Bruce, 1999; Vuilleumier, George, Lister, Armo-
ny, & Driver, 2005), so as to obtain information relevant for interaction, for instance, about
significant objects or events in the environment. Furthermore, the ability to discern and fol-
low others’ gaze direction constitutes an essential component of the ability to infer their cur-
rent mental states, and helps establish a common social context (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995,
2005; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Emery, 2000; Sebanz et al.,
2006). 
Experimentally, shared attention based on gaze following has been studied using the
gaze-cueing paradigm. This is a modification of the classical spatial cueing paradigm. In at-
tentional cuing experiments like Posner’s spatial cuing task (Figure A3), participants detect a
visual cue that appears at a peripheral location before the target appearance is showed. Cues
that correctly predict a target’s subsequent location are called “valid” and conversely, non-
predictive cues are “invalid”. Reaction times (RTs) are shorter to detect validly cued targets
than invalidly cued targets, indicating that people shift attention to the cued location. Two
types of attentional orienting have been identified in this task, exogenous orienting (in re-
sponse to events in the environment) and endogenous orienting (in response to internal fac-
tors such as motivations, expectancies, and goals) (Klein, Kingstone, & Pontefract, 1992;
Klein & Shore, 2000). Each of the attentional orienting types corresponds usually to different
cue types: Peripheral cues (e.g. a brief flash at the predicted target location) direct attention
exogenously, or centrally presented (symbolic) cues (e.g. target location informed using an
arrow or a word) direct attention endogenously. Peripheral cues tend to orient spatial atten-
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tion automatically or reflexively independent of their validity in a so-called bottom-up man-
ner. These cues often cannot be ignored and do not interfere with symbolic cues (Jonides,
1981; Muller & Rabbit, 1989). On the contrary, central symbolic cues require observers to
shift attention to the cued location in a top-down manner. In turn, these can more easily be
ignored, and peripheral cues can interfere with central cues resulting in slower RTs in the
valid condition, as compared to exogenous cues (Jonides, 1981; Muller & Rabbit, 1989).
Figure A3. Classical spatial cueing paradigm. Using a peripheral sudden-onset cue (Panel A) or a cen-
tral symbolic cue (Panel B) in a discrimination task. In Panel A, the target appears in the previously cued loca -
tion (valid trial), whereas Panel B shows an invalid trial in which the target appears in the uncued location. 
 Studies on attention orienting have provided substantial evidence that cognitive re-
sources are driven to peripheral locations by different kinds of cues which appear before a
target stimulus onset (Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980).
In the case of a standard gaze-cueing paradigm (Figure A4), gaze shift of a face (or
face-like) stimulus constitutes the cue. Typically, a face (real or schematic) in canonical view
is presented centrally prior to the onset of a target in the periphery. Subsequently, the face’s
eyes are directed towards one of the sides of the visual field – a potential target position. In a
typical gaze-cueing study, processing of the target (detection, localization, or discrimination)
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is facilitated when the gaze direction and target position coincide, relative to when the gaze is
directed elsewhere – gaze-cueing effect. Similar to traditional attentional cuing results, faster
RT for the cued targets are reported indicating that attention has been directed to where the
eyes were looking (e.g. Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999). Cuing effects are
reliably observed with Stimulus Onset Asynchronies (SOA) between 250 and 750 ms (Driver
et al., 1999; Kingstone, Tipper, Ristic & Ngan, 2004), and disappear around 1000 ms
(Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). The effect has been reported as early as 3 months of age (Far-
roni, Johnson, Brockbank, & Simion, 2000; Hood et al., 1998) and is present even for simple
schematic drawings of faces and eyes (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998). Likewise, the magnitude
of this orienting effect is similar regardless of the identity of the cue, whether it is a human
face, an animal face (e.g. ape or tiger), an object such as an apple or a glove with eyes (Quad-
flieg, Mason, & Macrae, 2004, see however Wiese, Wykowska et al., 2012 for different find-
ings), or an inverted face (Tipples, 2005).
Figure A4. Basic gaze-cueing paradigm. (A) using a schematic drawing (valid trial) or (B) a real-life
photograph of a face (invalid trial) in a discrimination task. 
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Following the attentional cueing literature, gaze cue being a symbolic centered cue
might then be described as endogenous orienting of attention. However, many studies (e.g.
Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) report that the effect is evoked in a reflexive (exogenous) way, in-
dependent of validity and volitional control. Collected evidence point out the reflexive charac-
ter of gaze-cueing effect, which Driver et al. (1999) summarized, as follows: “operating with-
out intention; operating contrary to intention; independent of set-size; unconscious; in-
nate; highly practiced; informationally encapsulated; cognitively impenetrable; modular-
ized; and dependent on dedicated neural systems” (pp. 531) 
More recently, it has been suggested that attentional orienting in response to gaze di-
rection is susceptible to top-down modulation (e.g., Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Kanwisher,
2000; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005). For example, Teufel and colleagues (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton,
& Davis, 2010; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010) proposed that information about others’ men-
tal states influences automatic components of the gaze-following response. Similarly, Wiese,
Wykowska, Zwickel, and Muller (2012) investigated whether the mere belief that the ob-
served agent is an intentional system influences gaze following. Interestingly, they found the
magnitude of the gaze-cueing effect to be dependent on whether or not the gazer was con-
strued as an intentional system, independently of the gazer’s physical appearance. Moreover,
Wykowska, Wiese, Prosser, and Muller (2014) showed that the modulation of the gaze-cueing
effect by beliefs about the gazer was mirrored by a modulation of the target-related P1 com-
ponent of the EEG, indicating that early processes of perceptual selection are prone to top-
down biasing from higher-order cognition. Taken together, these findings reveal that social
perception is the result of an interactive process that involves the integration of bottom-up
information provided by the stimulus and top-down influences by various social context vari-
ables. Similarly, Ristic & Kingstone (2005) addressed the differentiation between a pure bot-
tom-up reflexive and a top-down control approaches reaching a middle ground. The authors
claim that even though the response to the gaze is automatic, the face recognition is the result
of a top down process (e.g. Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Kanwisher, 2000). Once a stimulus ac-
tivates inferior temporal cortex and is perceived as a face with features such as eyes, the at-
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tentional effect of this stimulus appears to be insensitive to top-down modulation. To sum
up, social orienting of attention operates in complex dynamics that requires top-down control
to evoke the bottom-up mechanisms broadly reported in the literature.
1.2.5 Neural mechanisms that support gaze perception
Several sources point to the specialized cerebral mechanisms directly related in the
perception of gaze. Single cell recording (Perrett et al., 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994; Emery,
Lorincz, Perrett, Oram, & Baker, 1997) and lesion studies in monkeys (Campbell, Heywood,
Cowey, Regard, & Landis, 1990; Heywood and Cowey, 1992; Eacott, Heywood, Gross, &
Cowey, 1993) have shown that neurons in the STS are specifically sensitive to the orientation
of the eyes and recognition of others’ gaze location. Furthermore, electrophysiological studies
have revealed that: a) isolated human eyes evoke particularly large and early visual responses
as compared to whole face stimuli or other isolated facial features (e.g. Bentin, Allison, Puce,
Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Taylor, Itier, Allison, & Edmonds, 2001); b) in infants, the occipito-
temporal N170 evoked by isolated eyes, is present earlier than the same component elicited
by whole face stimuli, indicating a faster maturation of eye processing system (Taylor et al.,
2001; Farroni, Johnson, & Csibra, 2004; Farroni, Mansfield, Lai, & Johnson, 2004); c) eyes
evoke the earliest and largest face-sensitive ERP responses (Schyns, Jentzsch, Johnson,
Schweinberger, & Gosselin, 2003; Eimer, Lorincz, Perrett, Oram & Baker, 1997). Also, studies
revealed a close relation between STS and amygdala. Namely, the STS region is likely to be
essential for recognizing facial expressions as stimuli used in social communication, whereas
the amygdala is likely to be essential for attaching socio-emotional significance to these stim-
uli (for review see, Bickart, Dickerson, & Barrett, 2014). And d) enhanced early visual evoked
potentials (P1 and N1) were reported. Larger amplitudes and earlier onsets of these compo-
nents were found in a gaze-cueing paradigm in the valid condition (Schuller & Rossion,
2001). These unveiled that reflexive attention to gaze increases visual activity and speeds up
the processing of visual information –at least as soon as it reaches the extrastriate visual cor-
tex. In addition, authors reported an enhanced P3 component for invalid trials, which might
be related to decreasing target probability. 
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Similarly, neuroimaging studies in humans show that the superior temporal sulcus
(STS) region is involved in gaze and face processing (Hooker et al., 2003; Pelphrey, Singer-
man, Allison, & McCarthy, 2003; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; for a review
see Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). The intraparietal sulcus (IPS), which participates in
covert shifts of attention (e.g. Corbetta, 1998; Nobre et al., 1997), is also significantly activat-
ed during averted gaze perception (George et al., 2001; Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Hooker
et al., 2003; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Puce et al., 1998; Wicker, Michel, Henaff, & Decety, 1998).
Cells in the STS tuned to detect gaze direction, were found to modulate subcortical structures
that are specialized in reflexive spatial orienting –and might doing so in a relatively automat-
ic fashion. An fMRI study by Hoffmann and Haxby (2000) found that passive viewing of
faces that had averted gazes, elicited a significantly stronger response in the IPS bilaterally
and in the left STS, as compared to passive viewing of faces with direct gazes. This results are
consistent with Puce et al. (1998) that reported activation of the inferior temporal sulcus
(ITS) only to eye movements. Collectively, evidence suggests that even though STS and later-
al fusiform area are closely connected and work together in face perception, the ITS is partic-
ularly sensitive to gaze. Activity in the IPS might be associated preferably with the spatial as-
pects of perceived eye gaze and its role in directing attention. 
A more integrative approach postulates that two different mechanisms mediate the
gaze cueing effect. Evidence from a split-brain patient study (Kingstone, Friesen, & Gazzani-
ga, 2000) found that non-predictive gaze direction produces a rapid and short-lived attention
effect that is lateralized to patient’s face/gaze-processing right hemisphere. Interestingly,
non-predictive arrow direction elicited a cuing effect in both hemispheres. Furthermore,
Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone (2004) reported that in healthy observers eyes cues elicited a re-
flexive orienting of attention absent for arrows cues. Findings from both studies suggest that
attentional mechanisms involved in gaze following are indeed ‘special’. That is, reflexive ori-
enting of attention by gaze-cueing depends on two different neural systems, one mediated
subcortically and triggered by abrupt onsets (that supports reflexive attention to biologically
relevant stimuli); and second one mediated cortically and triggered by perceived gaze direc-
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tion (Friesen, Moore & Kingstone, 2005). Consistently, Greene and Zeidel (2011), reported a
right hemisphere bias for attentional orienting cued by gaze (facilitation effect for targets in
the left visual field), but not for attentional orienting cued by non-social stimuli. Taken to-
gether, authors suggest a theory of a separate neural system for orienting of attention in-
duced by social cues, as well as a theory of separate parallel and simultaneous neural systems
for attention in the two cerebral hemispheres.
Similarly, Hietanen et al. (2006) reported differences in the brain activity for gaze-
cued compared to arrow-cued orienting. Mainly, in gaze-cued orienting elicited only three
relatively small foci of activation in the left inferior occipital gyrus and right medial and infe-
rior occipital gyri. Meanwhile for arrow-cued orienting, elicited large bilateral post-central
activations in areas including the medial/inferior occipital gyri and medial temporal gyri, and
in the left intraparietal area. Arrow cueing also activated the right frontal eye and supplemen-
tary eye fields. Taken together, evidence suggest that orienting of attention by gaze and fol-
lowing of arrow cues are supported by different cortical networks. In summary, evidence
from several sources agree with the importance of the gaze-cueing effect and remark that
very specific brain areas and networks are related to this phenomenon observed behaviorally.
1.3 Gaze behavior in action sequences
If gaze direction provides important clues regarding an observed agent’s intentions, it
is highly plausible that humans use gaze direction to anticipate successive (action) steps in
complex action sequences, facilitating prediction of upcoming events in social environment.
Indeed, there is evidence that eye movements provide useful hints for understanding actions
and predicting successive action steps: Examining participants’ oculomotor behavior in a
block-stacking task, Flanagan and Johansson (2003) found that eye fixations invariably pre-
ceded the landing points of manual movements during task execution. Importantly, partici-
pants showed similar eye movement patterns merely by observing an actor performing the
same task. They concluded that during action observation, humans implement similar oculo-
motor programs to those employed in action production – indicative of anticipatory mecha-
nisms operating during action observation. Similarly, Hayhoe, Shrivastava, Mruczek, & Pelz
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(2003) recorded eye movements of participants in natural situations (i.e. making a
sandwich). Interestingly, eye fixations preceded action steps, that is, eye movements were
strongly coupled to the task-relevant objects and anticipated their use. That leads to the con-
clusion that fixations pick up critical information to perform a task and support high preci-
sion movements. In sum, both Flanagan and Johansson (2003) and Hayhoe et al. (2003)
showed that gaze behavior serves as a good hint regarding successive action steps of others.
Furthermore, Sebanz et al. (2006) found STS to be particularly involved in updating predic-
tions after a violation of an expected action sequence. Interestingly, as mentioned before the
STS region is also involved in gaze direction detection and gaze cueing (Haxby et al., 2000).
Hence, gaze following appears to be closely linked to anticipatory mechanisms in action. 
1.4 Aim of the project 
The aim of the present PhD project was to investigate whether high-level expectations
concerning others’ action goals and predictions regarding their successive action steps affect
the fundamental mechanism of gaze following. To date, most studies have examined sepa-
rately either gaze following or prediction mechanisms related to actions. The present project
was, to our knowledge, the first one designed to investigate how attention to objects in a nat-
uralistic scene is guided by two factors: the (perceived) gaze direction of an actor and back-
ground expectations regarding the action context. We designed a paradigm in which a gaze-
cueing procedure was embedded within a complex action context, where the context was in-
troduced at the start of each trial by an image that represented a certain social situation. Sub-
sequently, we presented to participants photographs of a (female) human agent who gazed ei-
ther at an action-congruent or an incongruent object. Participants’ task was to discriminate
the level of liquid (high vs. low) in a cup (target) situated next to an object (bottle) that could
be either (1) action congruent or not: the action-congruency factor; and (2) gazed-at or not
(gaze validity factor). The type of liquid in the (target) glass would always correspond to the
liquid in the bottle placed next to it. Participants knew which glass was the target on a given
trial, as the critical picture frame in the trial sequence contained only one glass filled with liq-
uid. The crucial question was whether discrimination performance would depend on whether
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the observed agent’s gaze was directed to the object that was congruent with the action con-
text, and whether the target was gazed-at by the observed agent. The paradigm was thus ex-
pected to engender two types potential conflict: one related to gaze direction being incongru-
ent with the action context, and one related to discriminating a target located on the side op-
posite to the (observed) agent’s gaze direction (validity of the cue). 
We expected performance in the target discrimination task to be affected by gaze va-
lidity, that is, observe the typical gaze-cueing effect. Furthermore, and importantly, we hy-
pothesized that gaze-cueing effects would be modulated by whether the (observed) agent di-
rected her gaze to an action-congruent or an incongruent object. The latter hypothesis was
predicated on two ideas: (1) humans typically expect gaze direction to precede successive ac-
tion steps (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Hayhoe et al., 2003), and (2) gaze-cueing effects re-
flect a combination of bottom-up reflexive mechanisms (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & King-
stone, 1998) and top-down modulatory influences (Teufel et al., 2010; Wiese et al., 2012;
Wiese et al., 2012; Wykowska et al., 2014). Thus, in the present paradigm, gaze-cueing effects
are likely to be modulated by the observers’ action expectancies: participants would expect
the (observed) agent to direct her gaze to the object that was to be manipulated according to
the action context (i.e., action-congruent object), and violation of this expectation would in-
fluence the mechanism of gaze following, possibly attenuating the validity effects. 
Behavioral studies
In Experiment 1, participants in general followed the gaze of the observed agent
(showed gaze cueing effects), though the gaze-cueing effect was larger when the actor looked
at an action-congruent object relative to an incongruent object. Experiment 2 examined
whether the pattern of effects observed in Experiment 1 was due to covert, rather than overt,
attentional orienting, by requiring participants to maintain eye fixation throughout the se-
quence of critical photographs (corroborated by monitoring eye movements). The essential
pattern of results of Experiment 1 was replicated, with the gaze-cueing effect being complete-
ly eliminated when the observed agent gazed at an action-incongruent object. These findings
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show that covert attentional orienting in response to gaze can be modulated by expectations
that humans hold regarding successive steps of the action performed by an observed agent.
EEG/ERPs Study
In the final study we examined –using the event-related potentials (ERPs) of the EEG
signal– which stages of processing are influenced by expectations about others’ action steps.
We used a modified paradigm that was used in the behavioral studies. Similarly to the behav-
ioral studies, a gaze-cueing procedure was embedded in successively presented naturalistic
photographs composing an action sequence. Our findings: (1) replicated behavioral gaze-cue-
ing effects modulated by whether the observed agent gazed at an object which was expected
to be gazed-at, according to the action sequence; (2) showed modulatory effects on the P1/N1
components locked to the onset of a target: while P1 was modulated by gaze validity with re-
spect to target location, N1 was modulated both by gaze validity and participants’ expecta-
tions about where the agent would gaze at to perform an action; (3) revealed a more positive
amplitude in the range of the N300 component –locked to the gaze direction shift– when the
gaze was congruent with the action sequence, relative to incongruent and neutral conditions.
Taken together, these findings revealed that confirmation or violation of expectations con-
cerning others’ goal-oriented actions can modulate attentional selection processes, as in-
dexed by early ERP components.
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2.1 Abstract
Humans attend to social cues in order to understand and predict others’ behavior. Facial expres-
sions and gaze direction provide valuable information to infer others’ mental states and inten-
tions. The present study examined the mechanism of gaze following in the context of partici-
pants’ expectations about successive action steps of an observed actor. We embedded a gaze-
cueing manipulation within an action scenario consisting of a sequence of naturalistic photo-
graphs. Gaze-induced orienting of attention (gaze following) was analyzed with respect to
whether the gaze behavior of the observed actor was in line or not with the action-related expec-
tations of participants (i.e., whether the actor gazed at an object that was congruent or incongru-
ent with an overarching action goal). In Experiment 1, participants followed the gaze of the ob-
served agent, though the gaze-cueing effect was larger when the actor looked at an action-con-
gruent object relative to an incongruent object. Experiment 2 examined whether the pattern of
effects observed in Experiment 1 was due to covert, rather than overt, attentional orienting, by
requiring participants to maintain eye fixation throughout the sequence of critical photographs
(corroborated by monitoring eye movements). The essential pattern of results of Experiment 1
was replicated, with the gaze-cueing effect being completely eliminated when the observed agent
gazed at an action-incongruent object. Thus, our findings show that covert gaze following can be
modulated by expectations that humans hold regarding successive steps of the action performed
by an observed agent. 
Keywords: gaze cueing, expectations, action prediction. 
2.2 Introduction
Social interactions require the ability to predict and understand others’ behavior and its
underlying intentions. To infer intentions and action goals, humans pick up various social sig-
nals, such as the others’ gestures or gaze direction, providing information about their focus of
attention or intended action steps. There is ample evidence showing that humans attend to fa-
cial expressions and gaze direction of others (e.g., Emery, 2000;  Langton & Bruce, 1999; Haxby,
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Vuilleumier, George, Lister, Armony, & Driver, 2005). The capacity
for discerning and following others’ gaze direction is an essential component of the ability to in-
Study 1:Gaze following is modulated by expectations  23
fer their current mental states, and helps establishing a common social context (e.g., Emery,
2000, Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Sebanz,
Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006; Itier & Batty, 2009). Gaze following has been extensively studied
using the gaze-cueing paradigm (e.g. Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999), in which a
face, in canonical view, is typically presented centrally prior to the onset of a target in the pe-
riphery. Subsequently, the face’s eyes are directed towards one of the sides of the visual field – a
potential target position. In a typical gaze-cueing study, processing of the target (detection, lo-
calization, or discrimination) is facilitated when the gaze direction and target position coincide,
relative to when the gaze is directed elsewhere – the gaze-cueing effect. The gaze-cueing effect
has been considered to rely on a reflexive mechanism (for review, see Hietanen, 1999), though
more recently, it has been suggested that attentional orienting in response to gaze direction is
susceptible to top-down modulation (e.g., Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Kanwisher, 2000; Ristic &
Kingstone, 2005; Bayliss, Schuch, & Tipper, 2010; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, & Muller, 2012;
Wykowska, Wiese, Prosser, & Muller, 2014). For example, Teufel and colleagues (Teufel, Alexis,
Clayton, & Davis G, 2010; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010) proposed that information about oth-
ers’ mental states influences automatic components of the gaze cueing effect. Similarly, Wiese,
et al. (2012) examined whether the mere belief that the observed agent is an intentional system
influences gaze cueing. They manipulated the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance by
instruction (in some conditions, participants were told that they were observing a human or a
robot, in others, that they were observing a human-like mannequin or a robot whose eyes were
controlled by a human). Interestingly, the authors found the magnitude of the gaze-cueing effect
to be dependent on whether or not the gazer was construed as intentional, independently of the
gazer’s physical appearance. Moreover, Wykowska et al. (2014) analyzed the event-related po-
tentials (ERPs) of the EEG signal recorded during the same task and found that the impact of
beliefs about the gazer on the gaze-cueing effect was mirrored by a modulation of the tar-
get-locked P1 component at posterior-occipital electrode sites, indicating that already early pro-
cesses of perceptual selection are prone to a top-down bias from higher-order cognition. Taken
together, previous findings reveal that social perception is the result of an interactive process
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that involves the integration of bottom-up information provided by the stimulus and top-down
influences by contextual variables.
If gaze direction provides important clues regarding the intentions of an observed agent,
it is plausible that humans also use gaze direction to infer the subsequent (action) steps in com-
plex action sequences, facilitating prediction of what others are going to do next and of crucial
upcoming events in social interactions. Thus, arguably, observing others’ gaze behavior might
elicit expectations about unfolding action sequences. Indeed, there is evidence that eye move-
ments provide useful hints for understanding actions and predicting successive action steps: ex-
amining participants oculomotor behavior in a block-stacking task, Flanagan & Johansson
(2003) found that eye fixations invariably preceded proactively the landing points of manual
movements during task execution. Importantly, Flanagan and Johansson observed similar eye
movement patterns when participants merely observed an actor performing the same task.
From this, they concluded that during action observation, humans implement similar oculomo-
tor programs to those employed in action production. Similarly, Hayhoe, Shrivastava, Mruczek,
& Pelz (2003) recorded eye movements of participants in natural situations, such as when mak-
ing a sandwich. The results indicated that eye fixations predicted action steps: eye movements
were strongly coupled to the task-relevant objects and preceded their use. The authors conclud-
ed that fixations serve to pick up critical information for performing the task and support high-
precision movements. In summary, both studies reveal that gaze behavior provides good hints
regarding successive action steps of others. 
Similarly to gaze-induced expectations regarding successive action steps, humans also
develop expectations regarding the way actions themselves unfold. For example, Wurm &
Schubotz (2012) showed that videos of action sequences incongruent with an action context pro-
duced longer recognition times, as compared to action sequences congruent with the context.
Furthermore, several authors have claimed that observing actions triggers a corresponding ac-
tion schema in the observer, including a goodness-of-fit evaluation between the observed action
and the action schema (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). An action schema can be described
on two levels: the goal of the action (see, e.g., Hamilton & Grafton, 2007) and its implementa-
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tion, with the latter defined by the actor’s movements and the objects involved (Manthey,
Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2002). In sum, evidence suggests that people have expectations re-
garding subsequent action steps, as goal-directed actions follow a largely predefined pattern: a
coherent sequence of steps, which makes actions relatively predictable (Schubotz & von Cra-
mon, 2002) – a notion also supported by electrophysiological evidence (Kilner, Vargas, Duval,
Blakemore, & Sirigu 2004). 
The aim of the present study was to examine the interplay between expectations about
an observed action and gaze-cueing effects. Consistent with the notion that, in daily life, gaze is
informative with respect to subsequent action steps of an observed agent, and with empirical ev-
idence in support of this notion [21, 22], we hypothesized that participants would have certain
expectations regarding where an observed agent should gaze, given the action sequence the
agent is performing. This, in turn, might affect gaze following (gaze-cueing effects), as gaze-cue-
ing effects have been shown to be affected by how much ‘social sense’ is involved in the gaze be-
havior (Wiese et al., 2012; Wykowska et al., 2014; Teufel et al., 2010a). With regard to expected
action sequences, if the observed gaze behavior is in line with the expected pattern, it would
make more social sense to the observer – who might therefore more readily follow the other’s
gaze relative to when the observed gaze behavior contravene expectations. To implement these
ideas in an experimental study, we designed a paradigm in which a gaze-cueing protocol was
embedded in a scenario that would evoke expectations regarding action sequences and gaze be-
havior of an observed agent. We were interested in examining how attention would be guided by
gaze direction (gaze-cueing effects) when the expectations regarding action sequences would be
either confirmed or violated. In our paradigm, a gaze-cueing procedure was embedded in a se-
ries of naturalistic photographs depicting a person (a woman named ‘April’) completing a goal-
oriented task. At the beginning of each trial, an image introduced an action goal: it depicted ei-
ther a guest asking her to bring her something to drink, or her flat mate asking her to fetch fab-
ric softener to do the laundry. Afterwards, April was depicted in the kitchen with two bottles lo-
cated to her left and right, respectively – each containing one of the liquids: either orange juice
or fabric softener. Beside each bottle, there was a plastic cup. Subsequently, April gazed at either
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the action-congruent or action-incongruent bottle (e.g., in the context of bringing a drink to her
friend, the congruent bottle would be the one with the orange juice, while the incongruent one
would be that containing pink softener). In the final frame, some of the liquid (either orange
juice or softener) appeared in one of the plastic cups (the target), and participants’ task was to
discriminate whether the level of liquid in the plastic cup was high or low. Only one cup con-
tained liquid and this always corresponded to the adjacent bottle. The crucial question was
whether (liquid-level) discrimination performance would depends on whether the target was, or
was not, gazed-at by the observed agent (validity of the gaze with respect to subsequent target
presentation – the classical gaze-cueing manipulation) and how the validity effect would be
modulated by whether the observed agent’s gaze was directed to the object congruent or incon-
gruent with the action context (congruency of the actor’s gaze with respect to the action). We
expected performance of the discrimination task to be affected by gaze validity, that is, to show
the typical gaze-cueing effect. Importantly, we additionally hypothesized that the gaze-cueing ef-
fect would be modulated by whether the observed agent directed her gaze to an action-congru-
ent or an action-incongruent object, in accordance with the ideas sketched above.
2.3 Experiment 1
Method
Participants. To determine the sufficient sample size for Experiment 1, we conducted
an a-priori power analysis for the effect of congruency on gaze cueing, using: (i) a moderate ef-
fect size (dz = .6), (ii) an α-error equal to .05, and (iii) a power level of .80 (as recommended by
Cohen, 1992). This analysis yielded an adequate sample size of 24. A total of 27 participants
were recruited for the experiment to obtain 24 useable data sets (three of the initial 27 had to be
excluded due to error rates higher than 15%). All 24 participants included in the analyses (age
range 21–35 years, M = 24.36 years; 16 women; all right-handed) reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and normal color vision. None of the participants had previously taken part in
an experiment with a similar design. 
Ethical statement. Experiment 1 (as well as Experiment 2; see below) was conducted
at the Department of Experimental Psychology, LMU Munich, where all experimental proce-
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dures involving the collection of purely behavioral data (e.g., reaction times and error rates)
with healthy adult participants (i.e., procedures that do not involve any invasive or potentially
dangerous methods) are approved by the Department’s ethics committee in accordance with the
Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Data were stored and
analyzed anonymously. Participants gave their informed, prior consent and were either paid or
received course credit for participating. Finally, the individuals depicted in the photographic im-
ages in this article (cf. Figures. 1, 2, 4) gave written consent (in conformity with the PLoS ONE
guidelines) for this material to be published.
Apparatus and Materials. Participants performed the task seated in a dimly lit exper-
imental cabin; looking at a 17” standard CRT monitor (100-Hz refresh rate, 1024 x 768 pixels
screen resolution) positioned approximately 85 cm from their eyes. Stimulus presentation on
the CRT was controlled by a Pentium IV PC using the E-Prime software (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, USA). The stimuli consisted of a series of color photographs taken for the pur-
poses of this study – see Figure A1. The photographic images covered a screen area of 13.75°
(width) x 10.35° (height) of visual angle; images were presented centrally, 6.7° from the screen
borders. 
Procedure and design. At the beginning of the experiment, participants received
written instructions describing that a woman, April, would find herself in one of two situations:
either a guest asks for something to drink, or a person who is living with her asks her to fetch
fabric softener to do the laundry (Figure 1). Sometimes, there was no social situation and the
context image was replaced by a picture of the sky with clouds, which meant that there was no
specific task to be performed by April (Figure 2). Next, April goes to the kitchen (not explicitly
presented in the trial sequence) where both potentially action-relevant items are to be found.
Accordingly, the next image presented on the trial depicts a ‘kitchen-counter’ scene with two
bottles, one positioned on the left and one on the right side, with a plastic cup next to each; one
of the bottles contains orange juice (yellow), the other fabric softener (pink). Subsequently, the
next image shows April standing between the bottles, gazing straight-ahead (in the direction of
the observer). 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of an example trial in Experiment 1, depicting a ‘laun-
dry’ context with an incongruent gaze direction and a validly cued target. Gaze direction in
Frame D is zoomed-in only for the purpose of illustration. Frame E shows both the target with a low level of liquid
as well as the target with high level of liquid. These targets are presented together only for illustration purposes; in
the experiment proper, only one of the two targets was presented.
Figure 2. The two other action context images. The ‘drink’ context (left) and the ‘neutral’ context
(right).
The next image shows April either making a gaze shift towards one of the bottles or
maintaining straight-ahead gaze direction. In the final image, one of the cups (target) positioned
next to one of the bottles appeared already containing a certain level of liquid – implying that
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April, in the meantime, had poured liquid into it. The sequence of actually lifting the bottle and
pouring the liquid was not shown, in order to prevent the introduction of additional directional
cues (arm extension, body posture) over and above April’s gaze direction. The participants’ task
was then to determine whether the level of liquid (in the target cup) was either low or high (tar-
get discrimination task). 
The most important manipulation was that before the frame containing the target (Fig-
ure 1, D) the actor’s gaze was averted to either the bottle congruent or the bottle incongruent
with the action context. That is, her gaze could be directed to the orange juice (yellow) in the
‘bring-a-drink’ scenario, or to the softener (pink) in the ‘laundry’ scenario (congruent condi-
tions); or her gaze could be directed to the softener in the ‘drink’ context, or orange juice in the
‘laundry’ context (incongruent conditions). In the congruency-neutral condition, the image pre-
sented at the start of the trial depicted a sky with clouds, rather than a social scene (see Figure
2). Therefore, although the actor's gaze was directed to one of the bottles, this had no relation to
an action context (because there was no action context specified in the congruency-neutral con-
dition). This condition was introduced as a baseline for the gaze-cueing effects. All three gaze-
congruency conditions were distributed equally across the experiment. 
Additionally, the gaze was either valid or invalid with respect to the target position (Fig-
ure 1, E). That is, the gaze direction could either coincide with the position at which the target
would subsequently appear (valid trials) or not coincide (invalid trials). In the neutral-validity
condition, the actor’s gaze remained looking straight ahead. The neutral validity condition was
introduced to test whether compatibility of the target itself with respect to the action scenario
had an impact on performance (independently of gaze direction). All three validity conditions
we distributed equally across the experiment. 
All nine conditions were pseudo-randomized across trials; also, the side on which each
bottle was presented, the target type (orange juice or softener), and the level of liquid (low or
high) were pseudo-randomized across trials – yielding a total of 48 trials per condition. The to-
tal number of trials was (9 x 48 =) 432, presented in 6 blocks of 72 trials each; an experimental
session, including training, took some 80 minutes to complete. 
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Individual trials consisted of the following sequence of images (cf. Figure 1): First, a fixa-
tion point appeared at the center of the screen for 1000 ms (Figure 1, A) Next, a centered con-
text picture was presented together with an explanatory sentence (i.e., “Could you bring me a
drink, please?” or “Could you fetch some softener, please?”) for 2500 ms; there were different
images for the “drink”, “softener”, and “neutral” contexts – see Figure 2. (Figure 1, B) This was
followed by a picture displaying a kitchen counter with two bottles on it: yellow orange juice and
pink softener, on opposite sides, equidistant from the center (5.71°); an empty transparent plas-
tic cup (“glass”) was located next to each bottle; this picture remained on the screen for 600 ms
(Figure 1, C) April appeared between the two bottles looking straight ahead for 2000 ms (Figure
1, D) For another 600 ms, she looked to one of the sides, or she kept looking straight ahead
(neutral validity trials). (Figure 1, E) An image was displayed (until response) in which April was
presented again looking straight ahead, and which contained the response-relevant target: one
of the glasses was partially filled with one of the two types of liquid to a high or a low level. Par -
ticipants were asked to respond as fast and as accurately as possible by pressing the left mouse
key for a low level and the right button for a high level of liquid. Finally, after the target re-
sponse, an action context question was presented (Figure 1, F) with three possible response op-
tions: ‘the aim of April’s action was: bring a drink to the guest, bring some softener, not defined’.
We introduced the action context question in 2/3 of trials to ensure that the participants cor-
rectly encoded and kept in mind the context throughout the trial. The response was given by
pressing the 1, 2, or 3 key on a standard computer keyboard, with accuracy (rather than speed)
being stressed. The location of the response alternatives was randomized for each trial. Feed-
back regarding accuracy was given (1000 ms) right after the action context response: the word
“correct” or “incorrect” in the center of the screen. Consecutive trials were separated by an inter-
trial interval of 500 ms. Feedback about accuracy and reaction time in the target discrimination
task for each entire block was provided in the breaks between blocks. Participants were asked to
fixate in the middle of each frame and not move their eyes. They were explicitly informed that
the direction of April’s gaze was not predictive with regard the location of the target.
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Analysis. Consistent with our hypotheses, our main analysis focused on reaction times
(RTs) in the target discrimination task as a function of gaze validity (valid, invalid) and gaze
congruency with respect to action context (congruent, incongruent, neutral). RTs, measured as
the time between target appearance and key press, were analyzed as follows: First, trials on
which the action context question had not been queried were excluded from analysis, as well as
trials on which the context probe was answered incorrectly (M = 6.66%, SD = 3.57). This was
done to ensure that participants had actually attended the action scenario on the analyzed trials.
Finally, trials with incorrect target responses (liquid-level discrimination) were eliminated (er-
ror rate M = 3.82%, SD = 2.64). Individual participants’ median RTs for each condition were
calculated and subjected to a 3 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors congruency
(congruent/ incongruent/ neutral) and validity (valid/invalid). In all analyses, degrees of free-
dom were adjusted according to Greenhouse-Geisser’s procedure when the sphericity assump-
tion was violated.
Results
Average median RTs and standard errors (in brackets) as well as error rates for each con-
dition are presented in the Table 1. 
TABLE 1: Group average RTs and error rates Experiment 1. Group average of individual median
RTs and associated standard errors of the means (SEMs, in ms), and a group average of error rates, as a function
of cue validity and gaze congruency.
Gaze Congruency
Validity
Valid Invalid
RT Error rate RT Error rate
Congruent 441 (15) 3.65% 480 (18) 4.25%
Incongruent 447 (15) 2.52% 462 (14) 3.91%
Neutrala 446 (14) 3.30% 464 (16) 3.73%
a‘Neutral’ refers to the ‘neutral congruency’ condition, in which observers were present with a neutral context
image; in this condition, the observed gaze shift could still validly or invalidly cue the location of the target.
Reaction Times. The ANOVA on median RTs with the factors congruency (congruent,
incongruent, neutral) and validity (valid, invalid) yielded a significant main effect of validity [F
(1, 23) = 31.698, p = .00001, ηp2  = .580]: discrimination RTs were shorter with valid (M = 444
ms; SEM = 14.6) than with invalid gaze cues (M = 468 ms; SEM = 15.94). The main effect of
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gaze congruency was not significant [F (2, 46) = .861, p = .429, ηp2  = .036]. Importantly, the
congruency × validity interaction was significant [F (2, 46) = 4.439, p = .017, ηp2  = .162]. Al-
though the validity effect was reliable in all three congruency conditions (valid vs. invalid for
congruent gaze: ΔRT = 38.98 ms, t (23)= 5.028 , 95% CI  [22.94, 55.01],p = .00004, dz = 1.02;
for incongruent gaze: ΔRT = 14.66 ms, t (23)= 2.932, p = .007, 95% CI  [4.32, 25.01], dz = .60;
and for neutral gaze: ΔRT= 18.16 ms, t (23)= 2.651, p = .014, 95% CI  [3.99, 32.34], dz = .54), it
was larger in the congruent relative to the incongruent and the neutral condition. To assess the
differences in gaze cueing effects as a function of gaze congruency, we calculated gaze-cueing ef-
fects (ΔRT = M RTinvalid –  M RTvalid) and subjected them to planned comparisons across the three
congruency conditions; see Figure 3.
Figure 3. Gaze-cueing effect as a function of gaze congruency in Experiment 1. Error bars rep-
resent the confdence intervals (95% CIs) adapted for within-participants designs according to Cousineau’s (2005)
procedure.
The planned comparisons (two-tailed t-tests, Bonferroni-corrected) of the gaze-cueing
effects revealed ΔRT to be significantly larger only for the congruent vs. incongruent conditions
[t (23)= 3.153, p = .013, 95% CI  [8.35, 40.26], dz = .64], but not the congruent vs. neutral condi-
tions [t (23)= 2.090, p = .144, 95% CI  [.20, 41.41], dz = .42]; the small difference between the
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neutral and incongruent conditions was not reliable [t (23)= .405, p = 1.00, 95% CI  [-21.39,
14.39], dz = .08], see Figure 3. 
Note that we also examined whether compatibility of the target itself with the action con-
text (e.g., orange juice in the ‘drinking’ scenario vs. orange juice in the ‘softener scenario’) influ-
enced performance. For this purpose, we analyzed separately trials on which April’s gaze re-
mained straight-ahead. We compared the target compatible-, incompatible-, and neutral-con-
text conditions for gaze-neutral (straight-ahead) trials. The ANOVA yielded no significant tar-
get-compatibility effect [F (2, 46) = 1.587, p = .216, ηp2  = .065]: compatible (M = 503 ms; SEM =
18.48), incompatible (M = 514 ms; SEM = 19.25), and neutral (M = 514 ms; SEM = 19.41). That
is, in the gaze-neutral condition, target discrimination responses were not significantly affected
by the compatibility of the target with respect to the action context.
Error rates. Participants’ error rates in the experiment were low overall (M = 3.56%,
SD = 3.62). An ANOVA conducted on the error rates (analogous in design to the RT ANOVA) re-
vealed none of the effects to be significant, all ps > .1. Nevertheless, in order to examine for po-
tential speed-accuracy trade-offs (SATOs), we carried out an ANOVA analogous to the analysis
on median RTs using so-called ‘inverse efficiency scores’ (IES) [(Townsend & Ashby, 1978;
1983). IE scores are calculated by dividing individual (in our case: median) RTs for a particular
experimental condition by an index of response accuracy: RT/(1 – p(E)), where p(E) is the error
probability. That is, the RT value is increased the more the lower the accuracy associated with
responses in this condition, effectively correcting for a speed-accuracy trade-off. Thus, examin-
ing the IE scores was designed to establish whether the pattern of RT results would remain un-
changed when correcting for response errors. This analysis revealed essentially the same pattern
of effects as the RT ANOVA: a significant validity effect, F (2, 23) = 34.130, p < .001, ηp2 = .597,
and a marginally significant interaction, F (2, 46) = 3.172, p = .051, ηp2 = .121. That is, the pat-
tern of RT results is reasonably robust, holding up even if when taking SATO effects into ac-
count.
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Discussion Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine whether gaze cueing is affected by expectations
regarding others’ gaze behavior in complex action sequences. To this end, we embedded a gaze-
cueing protocol within an action context. The question of interest was whether participants’ per-
formance of a discrimination task would be affected by the actor gazing (or not gazing) at the lo -
cation of the subsequently appearing target object (gaze-cueing effect); and if the gaze-cueing ef-
fect would be influenced by whether the actor’s gaze behavior was in line with participants’ ex-
pectations induced by the action context in which the actor was embedded. The results revealed
a main effect of validity, indicating that participants followed the observed agent’s gaze even
though it was uninformative with respect to the position of the target. This is consistent with the
idea that attentional orienting to gaze direction cues relies, to some extent, on a reflexive mecha-
nism (e.g., Hietanen, 1999,  Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Importantly, however, the gaze-cueing
effects were significantly modulated by the congruency of the gaze shift with respect to the ac-
tion context: the gaze-cueing effect was larger when the observed agent directed her gaze to the
context-congruent object, as compared to the context-incongruent object. In other words, the
congruency of the observed agent’s gaze direction with respect to the action context played a sig -
nificant role in the extent to which the agent’s gaze was followed: when the agent’s gaze shift
confirmed participants’ prior expectations as to the object she would gaze at (in accordance with
the action context), her gaze was followed to a larger extent compared to the action-incongruent
gaze-shift condition. 
In sum, Experiment 1 indicates that expectations regarding gaze behavior with respect to
action plans influence the degree to which the gaze of an observed actor is followed. However,
Experiment 1 did not permit us to determine whether the observed effects were indeed due to
covert attention, or rather to overt attention. That is, alternatively, the slower responses in the
invalid conditions might simply be due to participants having made (overt) saccades to the side
opposite to the target location (despite the instruction to maintain fixation), rather than being
attributable to violation of expectations (as assumed in the interpretation). Given this, the aim
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of Experiment 2 was to decide this issue by replicating the results of Experiment 1 while moni-
toring participants’ eye movements.
2.4 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to isolate the influence of gaze direction cues and expecta-
tions regarding the observed gaze behavior on covert attentional orienting in a naturalistic
scene. The paradigm and procedure were essentially the same as in Experiment 1, with the addi-
tion of monitoring participants’ eye fixation during critical frames of the trials using eye track-
ing. Also, to reinforce the instruction and make it easier for participants to maintain fixation
during presentation of the critical stimulus frames (Figure 4, Frames A-E), a fixation cross was
presented and remained on screen throughout frames A-E (see Figure 4). If participants’ gaze
deviated from the fixation cross by more than ±2º of visual angle (Figure 4, red dotted circle),
the trial was aborted and repeated at the end of the block. This ensured that any effects obtained
in Experiment 2 would not be attributable to shifts of overt attention. Note that the monitoring
of participants’ eye movements in a gaze-cueing paradigm embedded in a naturalistic action
scenario is a novel feature. While studies of simple, non-naturalistic scenarios have shown that
observing gaze shifts evokes both covert and overt orienting (e.g., Mansfield, Farroni, & John-
son, 2003; Ricciardelli, Bricolo, Aglioti, & Chelazzi 2002; Friesen & Kingstone, 2003), to our
knowledge, no studies on orienting of covert attention in response to gaze cues in complex natu-
ral scenes have monitored eye movements. 
Method
Participants. In order to determine the sufficient sample size for Experiment 2, we
conducted an a-priori power analysis for the effect of congruency (congruent vs. incongruent)
on the size of gaze cueing, based on: (a) the effect size of Experiment 1 (dz = .64); (b) an α-error
equal to .05; and (c) a recommended power level of .80. This analysis yielded an adequate sam-
ple size of 22 participants. Accordingly, 22 healthy volunteers took part in Experiment 2 (age
range 21–31 years, M = 24.8 years; 18 women; all right-handed), receiving monetary compensa-
tion or course credits for their participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, reported normal color vision, and provided written consent regarding participation in
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the experiment. None of the participants had taken part in Experiment 1 or in any other experi-
ment with a similar design. Note that only participants who were able to maintain fixation dur-
ing practice session (see Procedure section below) were admitted to the proper experiment. 
Figure 4. Schematic representation of an example trial in Experiment 2, with the same se-
quence of image frames as in Experiment 1 (Figure 1). The main difference between the experiments
was that a fxation marker was presented throughout the image sequence. Participants’ eye movements were re -
stricted to a circular area (represented by the dotted circle) of a radius of 2° around the (center of the) fxation
cross.
Apparatus and Procedure. The apparatus and procedure (as well as the design) were
essentially the same as in Experiment 1. However, there were a number of differences relating to
the monitoring of participants’ eye movements. Participants’ head position and thus their eye-
to-screen distance was ‘stabilized’ by means of a desk-mounted chin-and-headrest device posi-
tioned 60 cm in front of the CRT monitor. Eye movements were recorded monocularly (right
eye) using an Eyelink 1000 tower-mounted eye-tracking system (SR-research Inc.; sampling
rate: 2000 Hz; monocular accuracy: 0.25°–0.5°; resolution: 0.01°RMS (root mean square), re-
lated to the absolute sensor performance, the smaller the better). The apparatus was controlled
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using PsychToolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007) based on Matlab 2008a.
Stimulus presentation on the screen was controlled by an Apple Mac Mini 2.3 using the same
Matlab software. The images presented covered a screen area of 23.53° (width) x 17.06° (height)
of visual angle, and each image was presented centrally, 7.9° from the borders of the screen.
Note that while the images were of the same screen size as in Experiment 1, their perceived size
(in terms of degrees of visual angle) was larger in Experiment 2 owing to a reduction of the eye-
to-screen distance (according to the EyeLink user manual, the camera and illuminator should be
placed at a distance of 40 to 70 cm from the observer, with the ideal tracking distance being 50
to 55 cm; SR Research Ltd. Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, 2005-2008). In order to facilitate
maintenance of fixation, the sentences that had been presented under the context image in Ex-
periment 1 were eliminated in Experiment 2.
After receiving written instructions, participants performed two practice blocks without
eye tracking, and two additional blocks with gaze monitored by the eye tracker. The eye tracker
was calibrated using a 13-point calibration procedure, which was immediately followed by a val-
idation procedure. Calibrations were accepted if the mean error was less than 1.5°. In the experi-
ment proper, when participants’ gaze diverted from central fixation by more than 2°, the trial
was aborted and repeated at the end of the block (a trial block was finished only once partici-
pants had correctly completed all 24 trials within a block). In all other respects, the procedure
was similar to Experiment 1, except that (i) the neutral-gaze condition was dropped (after hav-
ing confirmed that target congruency per se did not affect participants’ responses [Experiment
1], there was no need to include the neutral gaze condition in the design of Experiment 2; thus,
including a neutral condition in Experiment 2 would not have yielded any benefits for the de-
sign); and (ii) all trials included a question at the end regarding the action context (rather than
only 66% of trials, as in Experiment 1). This was done in order to ensure that participants would
encode and maintain in memory the action context under conditions that were more demanding
than in Experiment 1 (in Experiment 2, participants were instructed to maintain fixation on the
fixation cross for an extended period of time, which can be considered an additional task). Final-
ly, (iii) trials with the ‘drink’ and ‘laundry’ scenarios had a second probe question (presented af-
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ter the action context probe) regarding the correctness of the liquid with respect to the action
context: “Did April take the correct liquid?” (Answers: number key 1 = yes, number key 2 = no);
this additional question was introduced to reinforce the relevance of the action context to the
entire task.
All six conditions were pseudo-randomized across trials; also, the side on which each
bottle was presented, the target type (orange juice or softener), and the level of liquid (low or
high) were pseudo-randomized across trials – yielding a total of 48 trials per condition (as in
Experiment 1). The total number of trials was (6 x 48 =) 288, presented in 12 blocks of 24 trials
each; an experimental session, including training, took some 60 minutes to complete. Feedback
about accuracy and reaction time in the target discrimination task for each entire block was pro-
vided in the breaks between blocks. Participants were asked to fixate in the middle of each frame
and not move their eyes and were explicitly informed that the direction of April’s gaze was not
predictive with regard the location of the target.
Analysis. The same preprocessing steps and criteria for exclusion of trials were used as
in Experiment 1. All participants maintained error rates lower than 15% in the action-context re-
sponses (M = 4.53%, SD = 3.19%). Median RTs were calculated for each participant and each
condition and were subjected to a 3 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors gaze con-
gruency (congruent, incongruent, neutral) and validity (valid, invalid).
Results
Average median RTs and standard errors (in brackets) as well as error rates for each con-
dition are presented in the Table 2.
Reaction Times. The 3 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA of the median RTs with the fac-
tors congruency (congruent, incongruent, neutral) and validity (valid, invalid) revealed both
main effects to be significant. The congruency effect [F (2, 42) = 4.058, p = .024, ηp2 = .162] was
due to RTs being faster in the neutral condition (M = 529 ms, SEM = 20 ms) as compared to the
congruent and incongruent conditions (M = 545 ms, SEM = 24.17 ms; and, M = 549 ms, SEM =
23 ms, respectively), though planned comparisons (two-tailed t-test) revealed only the differ-
ence between the neutral and incongruent conditions to be significant [t(21)= 2.964, p = .007, d z
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= .63]. The effect of validity [F (1,21) = 28.307, p = .00003, ηp2 = .574] was owing to RTs being
faster with valid (M = 525 ms, SEM = 21.27 ms) than with invalid gaze cues (M = 557 ms, SEM =
23.17 ms). 
TABLE 2. Group average RTs and error rates Experiment 2. Group average of individual median
RTs and associated standard errors of the means (SEMs, in ms), and a group average of error rates, as a function
of cue validity and gaze congruency.
Gaze Congruency
Validity
Valid Invalid
RT Error rate RT Error rate
Congruent 515 (24) 12.59% 574 (25) 12.97%
Incongruent 543 (23) 13.26% 554 (24) 13.35%
Neutrala 515 (19) 12.03% 543 (22) 12.03%
a‘Neutral’ refers to the ‘neutral congruency’ condition, in which observers were present with a neutral context
image; in this condition, the observed gaze shift could still validly or invalidly cue the location of the target.
Similarly to the Experiment 1, and importantly for the purposes of the study, the congru-
ency x validity interaction was significant [F (2, 42) = 11.875, p = .000082, ηp2 = .361], with the
validity effect being significant only in the congruent and neutral gaze conditions, but not in the
incongruent condition (valid vs. invalid for congruent gaze: ΔRT= 58.37 ms, t (21)= 6.803,
p = .000001, 95% CI  [40.53, 76.21], dz = 1.44; for incongruent gaze: ΔRT= 11.65 ms, t (21)=
1.651, 95% CI  [-3.03, 26.33], p = .114, dz = 0.33; and for neutral gaze: ΔRT= 27.42 ms, t (21)=
3.001, p = .007, 95% CI  [8.42, 46.43], dz = .63). Planned comparisons (two-tailed t-test, Bonfer-
roni-corrected) of the gaze-cueing effects (ΔRT = M RTinvalid – M RTvalid) revealed a significant
difference in ΔRT between the congruent and incongruent gaze conditions [t (21)= 5.080,
p = .00005, 95% CI  [27.6, 65.84], dz = 1.08] and between the congruent and neutral conditions,
[t (21)= 3.272, p = .011, 95% CI  [11.27, 50.61], dz = 0.70], but no difference between the incon-
gruent and neutral conditions [t (21)= 1.495, p = .450, 95% CI  [-6.17, 37.73], dz = .32]. In other
words, the gaze-cueing effect was enhanced in the gaze-congruent condition as compared to the
gaze-incongruent and gaze-neutral conditions (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Gaze-cueing effect as a function of gaze congruency in Experiment 2. Error bars rep-
resent the confdence intervals (95% CIs) adapted for within-participants designs according to Cousineau’s (2005)
procedure.
Error rates. An ANOVA conducted on the error rates (analogous in design to the RT
ANOVAs) revealed no significant effects (ps > .75, except for the main effect of congruency).
Only the main effect of congruency approached significance [F (2, 42) = 2.870, p = .068, ηp2 = .
120], with error rates being slightly larger for the incongruent (M = 13.3%, SEM = 3%) as com-
pared to the congruent and neutral conditions (M = 12.78%, SEM = 2.9% and M = 12.1%, SEM =
2.8%, respectively). Post-hoc comparisons (two-tailed t-test, Bonferroni corrected) revealed no
significant difference between the three congruency conditions (ps > .118). Note that the con-
gruency effect on the error rates is of the same direction, and thus reinforces, the effect obtained
in the RTs; that is, it is not indicative of a speed-accuracy trade-off. Similarly to Experiment 1,
we conducted an ANOVA on inverse efficiency scores (IES) to account for potential speed-accu-
racy trade-off (SATO). The analysis showed an identical pattern of results as those obtained with
uncorrected median RTs: a significant validity effect, F (1, 21) = 23.481, p < .001, ηp2 = .528; a
significant congruency effect, F (1.528, 32.095) = 7.813, p = .004, ηp2 = .271; and a significant
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interaction, F (2, 42) = 5.748, p = .006, ηp2 = .215 –again confirming that the pattern of RT ef-
fects cannot be explained by SATO influences.
Comparison across Experiments 1 and 2 
To examine whether the congruency factor had a similar influence on the effects of gaze
cueing in both experiments, we conducted a mixed-design ANOVA on the gaze-cueing effects
with congruency as within-participants factor and experiment as between-participants factor.
This ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of gaze congruency [F (2, 88) = 15.681, p = .
000001, ηp2  = .263], but no significant interaction between gaze congruency and experiment
(p= .237). Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed significant differences in cue-
ing effects between both the congruent and incongruent (p= .000001) and the congruent and
neutral conditions (p=.002). Furthermore, independent-samples t-tests (with the assumption of
homogeneity of variances ensured via Levene’s F test: p = .972, p = .233, and p = .150 for the
gaze-congruent, incongruent, and neutral conditions, respectively) revealed no significant dif-
ferences in the gaze-cueing effects between experiments for any of the congruency conditions (p
= .100, p = .726, and p = .417 for the gaze-congruent, incongruent, and neutral conditions re-
spectively). Thus, the two experiments yielded same pattern of results regarding the congruency
factor.
Discussion Experiment 2
To examine whether the findings of Experiment 1 were due to covert attention (rather
than eye movement artifacts), Experiment 2 used essentially the same design as Experiment 1,
including however the monitoring of participants’ eye fixation (trials with eye position shifts de-
viating by more than 2° from the fixation marker were excluded). Importantly, Experiment 2
replicated the results of Experiment 1 in all critical respects (in fact, without there being any sig-
nificant differences in the cueing effects between the two experiments; see Comparison across
Experiments 1 and 2), thus ruling out that the effect pattern was owing to overt, oculomotor ori-
enting responses to the observed gaze shift. As in Experiment 1, the main effect of gaze cueing
was significant, even with participants fixating the fixation cross throughout the critical trial
frames A-E (Figure 4). This verifies that participants covertly attended the object that the actor
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gazed at, even though the actor’s gaze direction was spatially uninformative with respect to the
target object. Likewise, the modulation of the gaze-cueing effect by the congruency of the actor’s
gaze (the gazed-at object) with the action context cannot be attributed to a congruency-depen-
dent modulation of overt eye movements, but instead reflects a modulation of covert attentional
orienting.
Importantly, no gaze-cueing effect was obtained in Experiment 2 when the actor’s gaze
was incongruent with the action context. That is, the facilitation normally engendered by gaze
cues was eliminated when expectations regarding which object would be gazed at (given the
overarching action context) were violated. Furthermore, the congruent gaze condition yielded
stronger gaze-cueing effects relative to the neutral action-context baseline. Restated, relative to
the baseline, the gaze-cueing effect was actually enhanced when the actor’s gaze ‘complied’ with
observers’ expectations regarding the object that would be gazed at in order to achieve the ulti-
mate action goal.
2.5 General Discussion 
The present study was designed to examine – using a naturalistic scenario – how the
gaze direction of an observed actor and the observer’s expectations, induced by the action con-
text, would influence the gaze-cueing effects. The results of both experiments showed that task
performance (i.e., discrimination of the liquid level in the target) depended on gaze-cue validity
with respect to the target side, with attention following the gaze direction of the observed agent
(‘April’) – the typical gaze-cueing effect. Importantly for the purposes of this study, the gaze-
cueing effect was modulated by whether the actor had gazed at an action-congruent or at an in-
congruent object: specifically, the cueing effect was significantly enhanced when the actor gazed
at an object congruent with the action context, relative to an incongruent object (Experiments 1
and 2), and it was entirely eliminated when the actor gazed at an object incongruent with the ac-
tion context, relative to a congruent object (Experiment 2).
Consequently, gaze cueing appeared to be modulated by participants’ expectations with
regard to the gaze behavior in the context of upcoming action steps within an overarching action
sequence. This is in line with the notion that humans activate a certain action schema (Manthey,
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Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2002) when observing others in action and (possibly implicitly) ex-
pect the gaze of the observed agent to precede (and, thus, provide a pointer to) successive action
steps (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Hayhoe et al., 2003). Hence, when the observed gaze be-
havior confirms participants’ expectations concerning the action sequence, the gaze cueing ef-
fects seem to be enhanced relative to when the gaze behavior violates the expectations. More-
over, gaze-cueing effects can even be entirely suppressed when the gaze behavior violates ac-
tion-related expectations. The complete lack of a validity effect seen in Experiment 2 when the
actor looked at an object that was action-incongruent further attests to the impact of top-down
control on bottom-up-driven attentional orienting in response to gaze direction. 
This set of findings is in line with a wide body of literature suggesting that higher-order
cognitive mechanisms can modulate orienting of attention in response to spatial cues (e.g., Pos-
ner & Cohen, 1984; Jonides, 1981; Muller & Rabbitt, 1989). Teufel et al. (2010a), Wiese et al.
(2012), and Wykowska et al. (2014) extended this evidence to gaze following, demonstrating
that gaze-cueing effects can be reduced (Wiese et al., 2012) or even eliminated (Wykowska et al.,
2014) by top-down regulation of the mechanisms involved. In particular, Wiese et al. (2012)
found that the context in which a gaze shift is performed – in their study: the presence versus
absence of physical reference objects to which the gaze would refer – modulates the degree to
which attentional resources are deployed to the cued location. On this basis, they proposed that
this modulation is mediated via a top-down mechanism which binds the gaze shift (in central vi-
sion) to a referred-to object (in peripheral vision). Subsequently, Wiese, Wykowska, & Muller
(2014) extended the notion of ‘context’ to also include social factors, such as knowledge of the
reliability of the cue provider, to account for their finding that gaze following was modulated by
whether participants perceived the gaze behavior displayed by the observed gazer as reliable and
highly predictive or not. Applied to the results of the present experiment, the top-down compo-
nent can engender both an enhancement of the gaze-cueing effect (namely, when the actor’s
gaze is seen to be shifted to the action-congruent object) and a suppression of the default, pre-
sumably ‘reflexive’, gaze following (when the actor’s gaze is shifted to an action-incongruent ob-
ject). 
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Finally, the present results extend earlier findings in that they suggest a link between ac-
tion prediction and gaze following. This is in accordance with neuroimaging results showing ac-
tivation of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) during action prediction (Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Per-
rett, & Kanwisher, 2004) and updating predictions after a violation of an expected action se-
quence (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Interestingly, the STS region is also involved in
gaze-direction detection and gaze cueing (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). Hence, also at
the neural level, following gaze seems to be closely linked to anticipatory mechanisms in action
observation. In more general terms, the close link between gaze following and action prediction
seems to be very adaptive: In order to interact with others, we need to know what the others are
going to do next (Frith & Frith, 2006). As people tend to look at objects they are planning to ma-
nipulate, gaze direction is informative about the identity (what?) and spatial location of attend-
ed objects (where?). Together with knowledge about people’s preferences (who?), which can be
acquired directly by interacting with them or indirectly by either observing someone interacting
with another person or receiving information about a person, we make inferences about their in-
ternal states (why?) (Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009) –so as to predict which action is most likely to
be performed next under the given circumstances. Thus, in our paradigm, knowing that April
was asked to bring a glass of orange juice to a guest, one would predict that she would be looking
for an empty cup and a bottle of orange juice (in order to pour some juice and bring the filled
glass to the guest). Therefore, through linking processing of gaze direction with action predic-
tion within a single paradigm, the current study demonstrates that spatial information derived
from gaze direction and context information about the action goal can be combined in order to
predict consecutive steps in an action sequence. Taken together, the present findings have im-
plications concerning the actual function of the gaze-following mechanism and the role it plays
in natural daily-life scenarios: arguably, gaze following has developed not just to pick up signals
that others convey regarding potentially relevant events in the environment, but also, and con-
ceivably foremost, to enable us to infer what others are going to do next (Cohen, 1995; Frith &
Frith, 2006).
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Concerning methodological implications, using a sequence of naturalistic photographs
brought our paradigm closer to more ecologically valid, real-life social scenarios. Admittedly,
though, it is still a rather artificial protocol in which participants are just observing a series of
static images. Arguably, however, this step needed to be made between entirely artificial stimuli
and completely realistic protocols. Having a sequence of images allowed us to maintain experi-
mental control over factors of interest and to circumvent certain confounds (such as involuntary
attentional capture or motion-related effects). With the present paradigm providing a first step
into more naturalistic scenarios, future research should take the design even closer to real life
(e.g., by using video or virtual-reality technology) and to a more interactive protocol (rather
than merely involving an observational stance). We contend that when the protocol is made
more naturalistic, the effects observed in the current study might turn out even stronger. 
Conclusion
The present study is, to our knowledge, the first to examine how attention is deployed
within a naturalistic visual scene as a result of the gaze direction displayed by an observed actor
and the observer’s expectations regarding the unfolding of the action sequence in a complex ac-
tion scenario. With the use of a novel paradigm that uses naturalistic images, we show that the
gaze-cueing effects, reflecting covert shifts of attention, can be modulated –either enhanced or
(even entirely) suppressed– dependent on whether the gaze behavior of the observed agent
(gazing at action-congruent or incongruent objects) does or does not fit with the expectations
that participants hold with regard to the unfolding action sequence. In summary, our findings
indicate that one of the key functions of gaze following is to monitor and predict others’ actions. 
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3.1 Abstract 
Predictive mechanisms of the brain are important for social cognition, as they enable inferences
about others’ goals and intentions, thereby allowing for generation of expectations regarding
what will happen next in the social environment. Therefore, attentional selection is modulated
by expectations regarding behavior of others (Perez-Osorio, Muller, Wiese, & Wykowska, 2015).
In this paper we examined –using the event-related potentials (ERPs) of the EEG signal– which
stages of processing are influenced by expectations about others’ action steps. We used a para-
digm in which a gaze-cueing procedure was embedded in successively presented naturalistic
photographs composing an action sequence. Our results showed: (1) behavioral gaze-cueing ef-
fects modulated by whether the observed agent gazed at an object which was expected to be
gazed-at, according to the action sequence; (2) modulatory effects on the P1/N1 components
locked to the onset of a target: while P1 was modulated by gaze validity with respect to target lo-
cation, N1 was modulated both by gaze validity and participants’ expectations about where the
agent would gaze at to perform an action; (3) a more positive amplitude in the range of an N300
component, locked to the gaze direction shift for gaze congruent with the action sequence, rela-
tive to incongruent and neutral conditions. Taken together, these findings revealed that confir-
mation or violation of expectations concerning others’ goal-oriented actions can modulate atten-
tional selection processes, as indexed by early ERP components. 
Keywords: gaze cueing, prediction, action sequences, EEG/ERP, ERP correlates of gaze cue-
ing.
3.2 Introduction
Gaze direction, besides being informative about others’ intentions, goals and interests,
also indicates their focus of attention, pointing to potentially relevant objects or events in the
environment. People tend to follow others’ gaze direction, as it has been widely demonstrated in
laboratory settings by means of a gaze-cueing paradigm in which participants detect or discrimi-
nate targets at gazed-at (i.e., validly cued) locations versus other (invalidly cued) locations. The
typical pattern of results shows faster responses for validly (vs. invalidly) cued locations (e.g.
Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) – the gaze-cueing effect. This effect has been tak-
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en to indicate that visual attention is allocated to a spatial location where others gaze, thereby
facilitating visual processing of stimuli (subsequently) presented at that location. While initial
findings tended to support the notion that gaze following is a purely reflexive process (Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999), more recent evidence indicates that gaze-cueing effects can
be modulated by top-down control (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010; Bayliss, Schuch, &
Tipper, 2010; Perez-Osorio, Muller, Wiese & Wykowska, 2015; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, &
Muller, 2012; Wykowska, Wiese, Prosser, & Muller, 2014; Wiese, Wykowska & Muller, 2014).
Factors such as knowledge about others’ mental states (Teufel et al., 2010; Teufel, Fletcher, &
Davis, 2010; Wiese, Zwickel, & Muller, 2013; Wiese, Wykowska, & Muller 2014), reliability of
gaze ‘cues’ (Wiese, Wykowska & Muller, 2014), background context in general (Wiese, Zwickel &
Muller, 2012) or expectations regarding others’ behavior (Perez-Osorio, Muller, Wiese &
Wykowska, 2015) modulate a relatively automatic component of spatial-attentional orienting in
response to gaze direction cues. 
While gaze direction is in general informative regarding others’ mental states, it particu-
larly facilitates understanding and anticipation of people’s next action steps. Predictions about
subsequent action steps based on gaze direction are possible due to the strong coupling between
action planning and eye movements. Flanagan and Johansson (2003) examined participants’
oculomotor behavior in a block-stacking task. The authors found that eye fixations proactively
preceded manual actions related to moving the blocks, and to the landing positions of those
manual actions. Furthermore, and importantly, simply observing another agent performing the
block-stacking task produced similar eye movement patterns. Flanagan and Johansson conclud-
ed that action observation (alone) evokes similar oculomotor programs to those employed in ac-
tion production, in particular, for object-oriented goal-directed task. Similarly, Hayhoe, Shrivas-
tava, Mruczek, and Pelz (2003), recording eye movements of participants in natural task situa-
tions (such as making a sandwich), found that gaze was directed to task-relevant objects that
were about to be manipulated. Hayhoe et al. argued that eye fixations provide stable representa-
tions of the visual task environment, allowing the extraction of critical information required for
high-precision movements. Taken together, both studies show that gaze behavior can offer reli-
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able information regarding successive steps in complex action sequences, in controlled as well
as natural action scenarios.
In this context, it is plausible to assume that expectations about forthcoming actions 
modulate gaze following. Indeed, a recent study (Perez-Osorio, Muller, Wiese, & Wykowska, 
2015) showed that gaze-guided orienting of attention can be modulated by expectations about 
observed action sequences. In that study, a gaze-cueing manipulation was embedded in an ac-
tion scenario consisting of a sequence of naturalistic photographs depicting a person (a woman 
named, e.g., Anna) completing a goal-oriented action. For each trial, an image defined a task for 
Anna: either a guest ask her to bring something to drink, or her friend ask her to fetch some fab-
ric softener to do the laundry. In the subsequent image, she was depicted in the kitchen, in the 
center of the image, behind a counter and looking straight ahead. On the counter, she would see 
a bottle with orange juice on one side and a bottle with fabric softener on the other, together 
with a plastic cup next to each bottle. Subsequently, Anna gazed at either the action-congruent 
or the action-incongruent bottle (e.g., within the action context of bringing a drink, the congru-
ent bottle is the one containing the orange juice, while the incongruent bottle is the one with the 
softener). In the final frame, one of the plastic cups (target) was filled with some liquid (either 
orange juice or softener). Only one cup had liquid in it, and this always corresponded to the ad-
jacent bottle (e.g., yellow juice in the cup next to the orange-juice bottle). Participants’ task was 
to discriminate whether the level of liquid in the plastic cup was high or low. Gaze cueing effects 
were analyzed with respect to whether the observed gaze behavior was in line with participants’ 
expectations regarding an action sequence (i.e., whether the actor, Anna, directed her gaze to an 
object congruent or incongruent with the action goal specified at the beginning of the trial). Re-
sults showed that when the actor’s gaze behavior violated the observer’s expectations, the gaze 
cueing effects were strongly attenuated or even completely suppressed, relative to both gaze be-
havior confirming expectations and gaze behavior in a neutral baseline conditions (in which no 
goal was previously specified).
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3.2.1 Aim of the study
The aim of the present study was to identify electrophysiological correlates of expecta-
tion-related modulations of gaze-cueing effects. ERP correlates of the gaze cueing effects have
previously been observed on the early sensory P1 and/or N1 components, locked to the onset of
the target (Schuller & Rossion, 2001). As the gaze-cueing protocol is a modified version of a
standard Posner-type cueing paradigm (e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984), the P1/N1 validity effects
can be interpreted analogously to validity effects observed on the P1/N1 components in other at-
tention-related cueing paradigms (Doalloa et al., 2003, Anllo-Vento, 1995; Eimer, 1994, 1998,
2000; Fu, Fan, Chen, & Zhuo, 2001; Hillyard, Luck, & Magnun, 1994; Hopf, Vogel, Woodman,
Heinze & Luck, 2002; Hopfinger & Mangun, 1998; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; Mangun et al.,
1997; Magnun, Hillyard, & Luck, 1993), that is, as indicators of the sensory-gain-control mecha-
nism (Mangun & Hillyard, 1990; Mangun et al., 1997; Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000). This
mechanism is thought to bring about an increase in the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for stimuli at
attended, relative to stimuli at other locations (Hawkins et al., 1990; Muller & Findlay, 1988). In
more detail, the P1 and N1 components observed at parieto-occipital sites show an earlier onset
and increased amplitudes for stimuli at cued, relative to other, locations (Mangun, Hillyard, &
Luck, 1993). The P1 component is thought to reflect a perceptual suppression for ignored loca-
tions, whereas the N1 indexes enhanced discriminative processing of stimuli within the focus of
attention (for reviews, see Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998, and Woodman, Vogel & Luck, 2000).
Recent findings suggest that the N1 effect reflects top-down modulation of discriminative pro-
cessing in areas of the ventral visual stream (Pedota et al., 2012). In a more social context, these
ERP indices of the sensory-gain-control mechanism (P1 and N1) have also been shown to be
modulated by attribution of mind to the observed agent (Wykowska, Wiese et al., 2014).
Therefore, within the context of the literature on P1/N1 effects in cueing paradigms, we
predicted the P1/N1 complex to be modulated not only by gaze-cue validity, but also by partici-
pants’ expectations regarding the gaze behavior of the observed agent in relation to her action
goals. To examine this prediction, we carried out an EEG/ERP experiment in which participants
performed the same task as in Perez-Osorio et al. (2015). We expected to find a validity-related
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modulation of the P1/N1 ERP components related (i.e., locked) to target onset in the discrimina-
tion task. Furthermore, we aimed at examining ERP effects related to gaze shifts themselves,
and whether they confirm or violate participants’ expectations regarding the action sequence of
the observed agent. 
Here, we based our hypotheses regarding the ERP effects on previous literature regard-
ing neural activity related to expectations: For example, Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison, and Mc-
Carthy (2003) examined the degree of brain activation elicited by perceived gaze shifts directed
either towards (congruent) or away from (incongruent) a location that contained a small
checkerboard (visual stimulus). Authors reported that all observed gaze shifts consistently elicit-
ed larger activation in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), intra parietal sulcus (IPS),
and fusiform gyrus (FFG) compared to no shifts. Importantly, however, the activation was in-
creased when perceived gaze shifts were incongruent with the location of the visual stimulus,
relative to congruent locations. Corresponding findings have been reported in analogous studies
that examined event-related potentials (ERPs): an enhanced posterior occipital component
(N330) locked to gaze shift was found to be more negative when the observed gaze shifts were
incompatible with the location of a visual stimulus, relative to compatible conditions (Senju,
Johnson, & Csibra, 2006; Senju, Csibra, & Johnson 2008). Authors argued that the observed ac-
tivation was attributed to operation of the STS in response to violations of expectation for hu-
man action, in line with Pelphrey and colleagues (2003). Using a similar paradigm, Tipples,
Johnston, and Mayes (2013) examined ERPs when participants were observing two types of
central cues – either a human agent’s gaze or an arrow symbol – directed to a location that
could contain a visual target (participants task was to determine whether the direction of the cue
and the visual stimulus matched or not). Results revealed a congruency effect for both cues gaze
shift and arrow onsets on the N300 component in the time window between 310-350 ms in the
parieto-occipital areas similar to those reported by Senju and colleagues (2006, 2008). Impor-
tantly, though, the effect was more pronounced for the gaze shifts, relative to the arrows. Taken
together, Tipples and colleagues suggested that activation observed in STS reflects a more gen-
eral brain mechanism related to detection of unexpected events for both social and nonsocial
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stimuli. Therefore, in our design we also expected an ERP component elicited around 300 ms
after the shift of the gaze to be modulated by expectations that participants held regarding the
actor’s gaze behavior Importantly, our study provided an additional unique contribution to the
state-of-the-art literature: we included a neutral baseline which allowed for interpreting the re-
sults in a univocal manner. In the studies of Pelphrey, et al., 2003, Senju et al., 2003, 2006, as
well as Tipples et al., 2012, no neutral baseline condition was used, restricting analysis to com-
parisons between incongruent and -congruent conditions. Therefore, the observed effects could
either be due to violations of observer’s expectations (larger STS activity and ERP amplitude); or
confirmation of observers’ expectations (smaller activity and ERP amplitudes). Thus, including
a neutral baseline in the present study allowed for univocal interpretation of the effects related
to expectancies regarding behavior of the observed agent. In sum, in line with findings of an ex-
pectancy-related N300 ERP component in paradigms with gaze-direction shifts (Senju et al.,
2006, 2008; Tipples et al., 2013), we expected a modulation of the N300 locked to the gaze shift
(i.e., an event preceding target presentation), which would be related to participants’ expecta-
tions regarding the behavior of the observed agent.
3.3 Methods
Participants. A total of twenty-two volunteers (taking part in the experiment for course
credits or for honorarium) were recruited. Out of these twenty-two, eighteen participants pro-
vided usable data sets (artifact-free trials >70%) (Age: M = 23.33 years, SD = 1.84; 13 women, 1
left-handed). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal color vision,
and provided written informed consent. None of the participants included in the analyses had
reported history of neurological diseases, or had previously taken part in an experiment with a
similar design.
Apparatus and Stimuli. The experiment was performed in a dimly lit cabin. Partici-
pants looked at a 17” standard CRT monitor (100-Hz refresh rate, 1024 x 768 pixels screen reso-
lution) positioned approximately 85 cm from their eyes. Stimulus presentation was controlled
by a Pentium-IV PC using the software package E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Pitts-
burgh, USA). The stimuli consisted of a series of color photographs taken for the purposes of
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this study – see Figure 1. The photographic images covered a screen area of 13.75° (width) x
10.35° (height) of visual angle; images were presented centrally, 6.7° from the screen borders. 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of an example trial, depicting a ‘laundry’ context with an incon-
gruent gaze direction and a validly cued target. Gaze shift related ERPs were recorded in the Frame D, meanwhile
target related ERPs were recorded in the Frame E. Gaze direction is zoomed-in only for the purpose of illustra-
tion.
Design and Procedure: The present study used a 3 x 2 factorial design (gaze congru-
ency: congruent/incongruent/neutral; gaze validity: valid/invalid). Gaze congruency was ma-
nipulated by embedding the trial sequence within an action scenario. The action scenario was
introduced in an image presented at the beginning of each trial (randomized across trials). The
scenario could either be (1) “bringing a drink to a friend”, (2) “bringing softener to a flat-mate”,
or (3) neutral (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The two other action context images. The ‘drink’ context (left) and the ‘neutral’ context
(right).
After the scenario was set, the main character, “Anna”, was presented between two ob-
jects (see frame C of Figure 1), one of which was congruent with the action scenario, and the oth-
er incongruent. At this point, participants would form an expectation regarding where Anna
would direct her gaze to (i.e., to the action-congruent object) in order to perform her task. The
next frame depicted Anna gazing at one of the objects (either the one congruent or that incon-
gruent with the action context). Finally, in the last frame (frame E of Figure 1), a target appeared
in one of the cups next to one of the objects. As Anna had gazed at one of the objects in the pre-
ceding frame, the target could be either validly cued or invalidly cued by Anna’s gaze (indepen-
dently of, and orthogonal to, whether Anna had gazed at the action-congruent or the incongru-
ent object). Thus, the two factors (congruency and validity) were operationalized as: (1) Anna’s
gaze landing on an object congruent or incongruent with the action context, and (2) the target
object being validly or invalidly cued (in terms of location)  by Anna’s gaze direction. The most
important manipulation was that before the frame containing the target (Figure 1D) the actor’s
gaze was directed to either the bottle congruent or the bottle incongruent with the action con-
text. That is, her gaze could be directed to the orange juice (yellow) in the ‘bring-a-drink’ sce-
nario, or to the softener (pink) in the ‘laundry’ scenario (congruent conditions); or her gaze
could be averted to the softener in the ‘drink’ context, or orange juice in the ‘laundry’ context
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(incongruent conditions). In the congruency-neutral condition, the image presented at the start
of the trial depicted a sky with clouds, rather than a social scene (see Figure 2). Therefore, al-
though the actor’s gaze was directed to one of the bottles, this had no relation to an action con-
text (because there was no action context specified in the congruency-neutral condition). This
condition was introduced as a baseline for the gaze-cueing effects. 
The conditions were distributed evenly across the experiment (33% for each gaze con-
gruency condition and 50% for each validity condition). All conditions, including position of the
bottles (i.e., orange juice/softener on the left/right), the target type (orange juice or softener),
and the level of liquid (low/high) were pseudo-randomized across trials. In total, the experiment
consisted of 576 trials divided into 24 blocks. Participants had two additional blocks for practice
before the actual experiment. Feedback about accuracy and reaction time in the target discrimi-
nation task for each trial block was provided in the breaks between blocks. Participants were
asked to fixate on the fixation cross in the center of the screen throughout the trial (see Figure
1). Additionally, they were explicitly informed that the direction of Anna’s gaze was not predic-
tive with regard the location of the target.
Individual trials consisted of the following sequence of images (cf. Figure 1): First, a fixa-
tion point appeared at the center of the screen for 500 ms (Figure 1A). Next, a centered context
picture was presented for 1500 ms; there were different images for the “drink”, “softener”, and
“neutral” contexts – see Figure 2. (Figure 1B) This was followed by a picture displaying a kitchen
counter with two bottles on it: yellow orange juice and pink softener, on opposite sides, equidis-
tant from the center (5.71°); an empty transparent plastic cup (“glass”) was located next to each
bottle; this picture remained on the screen for 600 ms (Figure 1C) Anna appeared between the
two bottles looking straight ahead for 600 ms (Figure 1D). For another 600 ms, she looked to
one of the sides, or she kept looking straight ahead (neutral validity trials). (Figure 1E) An image
was displayed (until response) in which Anna was presented again looking straight ahead, and
which contained the response-relevant target: one of the glasses was partially filled with one of
the two types of liquid to a high or a low level. The task was to determine whether the level of
liquid in the target cup was low or high (target discrimination task). Participants were asked to
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respond as fast and as accurately as possible by pressing the left mouse key for a low level and
the right button for a high level of liquid. After the target response, two questions were present-
ed (Figure 1F): (i) an action-context question (“The aim of Anna’s action was: bring a drink to
the guest/bring softener to her flat-mate/not defined”; the arrangement of the three possible
answers was randomized across trials), and (ii) a question regarding the liquid (Did Anna pour
the correct liquid?: Yes/No/No task) with three possible response options: ‘the aim of Anna’s ac-
tion was: bring a drink to the guest, bring some softener, not defined’. Responses to both ques-
tions were given by pressing the 1, 2, or 3 key on a standard computer keyboard, with response
accuracy (rather than speed) being stressed. Feedback about accuracy and reaction time in the
target discrimination task for each entire block was provided in the breaks between blocks. 
Behavioral analysis
Behavioral analyses were conducted as follows: first, trials with incorrect responses to
the action and liquid questions were excluded (this was intended to ensure that the analyses
were performed on trials in which participants had actually encoded and maintained the action-
scenario information). Second, trials with incorrect target-discrimination responses were ex-
cluded. Observers’ error rates were less than 3% for all tasks: liquid-level discrimination (target
response), M = 1.29%, SD = 0.01; action question, M = 2.60%, SD = 0.03; and liquid question,
M = 2.84%, SD = 0.03. Next, individual participants’ median reaction times (RTs) were calculat-
ed for each condition and subjected to a 3 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors gaze
congruency (congruent/ incongruent/ neutral) and gaze cue validity (valid/ invalid). In all
analyses, when the sphericity assumption was violated, degrees of freedom were adjusted ac-
cording to Greenhouse-Geisser’s procedure.
EEG recording and analysis
EEG was recorded with Ag-AgCl electrodes from 64 electrodes of an active electrode sys-
tem (ActiCap, Brain Products, GmbH, Munich, Germany). Horizontal and vertical EOG were
recorded bipolar from the outer canthi of the eyes and from above and below the observer’s left
eye, respectively. All electrodes were referenced to Cz and re-referenced offline to the average of
all electrodes. Electrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. Sampling rate was 500 Hz, and the
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EEG activity was amplified with a band-pass filter of 0.1 to 250 Hz using BrainAmp amplifiers
(Brain Products, Munich).
Raw data was filtered offline using a 30-Hz high-cutoff filter. The data was averaged over
800-ms epochs including a 200-ms pre-stimulus baseline, time-locked to (1) target onset and to
(2) gaze shift onset. For eye-movement artifacts, we inspected the F10, F9, Fp1, and vEOG chan-
nels using an automatic artifact-rejection procedure. Trials with eye movements and blinks on
either of the channels specified above (indicated by any absolute voltage difference in a segment
exceeding 50 µV or voltage steps between two sampling points exceeding 80 µV) were excluded
from analyses prior to averaging. Moreover, channels with other artifacts (all channels consid-
ered) were excluded if amplitude exceeded ± 80 µV or any other voltage that was lower than
0.10 µV for a 100-ms interval. The epochs were baseline-corrected with the 200-ms baseline pe-
riod prior to stimulus onset.
Target-locked ERPs 
To examine the ERP correlates of the behavioral gaze-cueing effect, we focused on the
P1/N1 components locked to the target onset. The time windows for the P1 and N1 were selected
based on the latency of the grand-average peak amplitude in the gaze-neutral condition for the
O1, O2, PO3, PO4, PO7, and PO8 channels (pooled). For the P1 peak at 100 ms, a time window
between 80–120 ms (±20 ms, relative to the peak latency) was selected; and for the N1 peak at
183 ms, a time window between 143–223 ms (±40 ms relative to the peak latency). The mean
amplitudes within the respective time windows were subjected to separate two-way ANOVAs
with gaze congruency (congruent, incongruent, vs. neutral) and validity (valid vs. invalid) as
within-subject factors. Planned comparisons (two-tailed t-tests) were conducted for the valid
versus invalid conditions in each gaze congruency conditions. Where appropriate, statistics were
corrected according to Greenhouse-Geisser for potential nonsphericity. The experiment had 96
repetitions per condition. After rejection of eye movement artifacts and incorrect-response tri-
als, 74 trials remained on average in each experimental condition (gaze congruent valid: 74; and
invalid: 74; gaze incongruent valid: 70; and invalid: 69, gaze congruency neutral: valid 76; and
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invalid: 78, trials). Level of liquid (high/low) and side of presentation (left/right) were averaged
together.
Gaze-shift-locked ERPs
To examine the brain responses to violations of (action-context-related) expectations, we
focused on ERPs locked to onset of Anna’s gaze shift, in particular, the N300, with the analyses
focusing on the comparison between the gaze-congruency conditions. The gaze-locked activity
was measured at Left and Right Lateral (electrode) Regions of Interest (following Senju et al.,
2006, and Tipples et al., 2012), including the electrodes TP7, TP8, P7, P8, T7, and T8. As visual
inspection of the grand average revealed the N300 component to be relatively broad (which is
also in line with the findings of Tipples et al., 2013), we selected a time window of ±100 ms cen-
tered on 300 ms following the onset of the gaze shift. The mean amplitudes of the EEG signal in
this 200–400-ms time window were subjected to a one-way ANOVA with congruency (congru-
ent, incongruent, vs. neutral) as a within-subject factor. Where appropriate, statistics were cor-
rected according to Greenhouse-Geisser for potential nonsphericity.
The experiment included 192 repetitions per gaze congruency condition. After rejection 
of eye movement artifacts and incorrect response trials, 160 repetitions remained on average 
(congruent: 157; incongruent: 158; and neutral: 165 trials). Orange-juice and softener bottles, as 
being the gazed-at objects, were averaged together.
3.4 Results
Behavioral Data
Average median RTs and standard errors for each condition are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Average Median RTs and SEM [in ms] as a function of cue validity and gaze congruency.
Gaze congruency
Validity
Valid Invalid
Congruent 485 [21] 540 [28]
Incongruent 506 [25] 513 [23]
Neutral 479 [24] 499 [24]
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The 3 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA of the median RTs with the factors congruency 
(congruent, incongruent, neutral) and validity (valid, invalid) revealed both main effects to be 
significant. The congruency effect [F (1.24, 21.19) = 5.899, p = .019, ηp2 = .258] was due to RTs 
being faster in the neutral condition (M [SEM] = 489 [24] ms) as compared to both the congru-
ent and the incongruent condition (M [SEM] = 512 [24] ms and, 509 [24] ms, respectively), 
though planned comparisons (two-tailed t-test, Bonferroni corrected) revealed that only the dif-
ference between the neutral and congruent to be significant [t (17)= 2.722, p = .043, dz = .64]. 
The main effect of validity [F (1,17) = 34.209, p = .00002, ηp2 = .668] was due to RTs being 
faster with valid (M [SEM] = 490 [22] ms) than with invalid gaze cues (M [SEM] = 517 [25] ms).
Figure 3. Gaze-cueing effect as a function of gaze congruency in the behavioral, RT data. Error 
bars represent 95%-confdence intervals (CIs) adapted to within-participants designs according to Cousineau’s 
(2005) procedure.
Most importantly for the purposes of this experiment, and replicating the results of 
Perez-Osorio et al. (2015), the interaction between congruency and validity was significant [F 
(1.202, 20.423) = 4.547, p = .039, ηp2 = .211], with the validity effect being significant only in the
congruent and neutral gaze conditions, but not in the incongruent condition (valid vs. invalid 
for congruent gaze: ∆RT= 55.36 ms, t(17)= 3.778, p = .002, dz = 0.89; for incongruent gaze: ∆RT
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= 6.86 ms, t (17)= .651, p = .524, dz = 0.15; and for neutral gaze: ∆RT = 20.20 ms, t (17)= 4.999, 
p = .0001, dz = 1.16). Planned comparisons (two-tailed t-tests) of the gaze-cueing effects (∆RT = 
M RTinvalid – M RTvalid) revealed a significant difference in ∆RT between the congruent and 
incongruent gaze conditions [t (17)= 2.170, p = .044, dz = 0.51] and between the congruent and 
neutral conditions, [t (17)= 2.570, p = .020, dz = 0.60], but no difference between the incongru-
ent and neutral conditions [t (17)= -1.121, p = .278, dz = 0.26]. In other words, the gaze-cueing 
effect was significantly enhanced in the gaze-congruent condition as compared to the gaze-in-
congruent and gaze-neutral conditions (see Figure 3).
EEG results
Target-locked ERPs
Grand-average ERPs over the 18 subjects elicited by the onset of the target display are il-
lustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Grand average ERP waveforms time-locked to target onset. Solid lines represent valid 
trials, dashed lines invalid trials. (A) Congruent, (B) incongruent, and (C) neutral gaze-congruency conditions. (D) 
Difference waves valid vs. invalid trials. P1 time window: 80–120 ms; N1 time window: 143–223 ms. 
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P1 component
Analysis of amplitudes in the P1 time window 80–120 ms post-target onset revealed a
main effect of gaze-direction validity [F (1, 17) = 6.141, p = .024, ηp2 = .265], due to more positive
amplitudes for trials with valid (M [SEM] = .049 [.276] µV) as compared to invalid gaze cues (M
[SEM] = -.230 [.261]µV). However, neither the main effect of congruency [F (2, 34) = .123, p = .
884, ηp2 = .007] nor the interaction between congruency and validity were significant [F (2, 34)
= .102, p = .806, ηp2 = .013].
N1 component
Analysis of amplitudes in the N1 time window between 143–223 ms post-target onset re-
vealed a main effect of validity [F (1, 17) = 10.670, p = .005, ηp2 = .386], due to more negative
amplitudes for valid (M [SEM] = -2.48 [.418] µV) relative to invalid gaze cues (-1.70 [.425] µV);
the main effect of congruency was non-significant [F (2, 34) = .365, p = .697 ηp2 = .021]. Impor-
tantly, and in line with the behavioral results, the interaction between congruency and validity
was significant [F (2, 34) = 11.755, p = .0001, ηp2 = .406], with the validity effect being reliable
only in the congruent- and neutral-gaze conditions, but not in the incongruent condition (valid
vs. invalid for congruent gaze: -1.36 µV, t(17)= 4.409, p = .0003, dz = 1.03; for incongruent gaze:
-.263 µV, t (17)= .930, p = .365, dz = 0.22; and for neutral gaze: -.708 µV, t (17)= 3.287, p = .
004, dz = 0.77). Similarly, analyses of the validity effect (mean amplitudes valid minus mean
amplitudes invalid) between gaze-congruency conditions revealed significant differences for
congruent vs. incongruent [t (17)= 5.755, p = .00007, dz = 1.36], and congruent vs. neutral [t (17)
= 3.026, p = .023, dz= .71], but not incongruent vs. neutral [t (17) = 1.652, p = .35, dz = .39 ]
(planned comparisons, Bonferroni corrected). 
Gaze-shift-locked N300 
Grand-average ERPs elicited by the onset of the gaze-shift display are illustrated in Fig-
ure 5. The one-way ANOVA (with the within-subject factor congruency: congruent, incongruent,
neutral) on the mean amplitudes of the N300 component (in the time window 200–400 ms) in
the region of interest (covering the channels TP7, TP8, P7, P8, T7, and T8), locked to the onset
of the gaze shift, revealed a significant congruency effect, F (2, 34) = 6.203, p = .005, ηp2 = .267.
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As corroborated by subsequent planned comparisons, this was due to a significantly more nega-
tive amplitude for incongruent (M [SEM] = -1.09 [.38] µV) compared to congruent trials (-.48
[.33] µV), t (17) = 3.242, p = .005, dz = .76; see Figure 5. Importantly, however, there was no sig-
nificant difference in the mean amplitudes (p = .57) between the incongruent and the neutral
condition (M [SEM]= -.98 [.41] µV). The neutral condition differed significantly only from the
more positive amplitude of the congruent condition, t (17) = 2.760, p = .013, dz = .65. 
Figure 5. Grand average ERP waveforms time-locked to gaze-shift onset. N300 time window:
200–400 ms. 
3.5 Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the stages of processing at which expecta-
tions regarding gaze behavior of others’ modulate gaze cueing effects. To this end, we used a
paradigm that embedded a gaze-cueing protocol within a complex action sequence. A series of
naturalistic photographs depicted a woman (Anna) completing a goal-oriented action. In the
critical frame within the trial sequence, Anna could gaze either at an object that the observer ex-
pected to be manipulated by Anna, based on the action Anna ‘instructed’ to perform; i.e., the ac-
tion-congruent object. Alternatively, Anna could gaze at the other, action-incongruent object.
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Participants were asked to make a discrimination of the level of liquid positioned in a cup next
to the object gazed-at by Anna (validly cued) or, alternatively, a cup next to the other object (in-
validly cued by Anna’s gaze). Importantly, gaze congruency with respect to the action scenario
and gaze validity were manipulated orthogonally. Gaze-cueing effects were calculated as the dif-
ference in RTs for validly vs. invalidly cued objects (in terms of location), and analyzed in rela-
tion to whether Anna gazed at a congruent or an incongruent object (in terms of action goal).
We expected to replicate behavioral results previously reported by Perez-Osorio et al. (2015),
that is, attenuation or complete abolishment of the gaze-cueing effects when the actor’s gaze be-
havior violated participants’ expectations regarding the action sequence. In terms of ERPs, we
expected the P1/N1 complex (target-locked) to show validity effects being modulated by gaze
congruency. Target-locked ERPs were analyzed for the parieto-occipital region (O1, O2, PO3,
PO4, PO7, and PO8) for the P1/N1 components (time windows of 80–120 ms and, respectively,
143–223 ms),following Schuller & Rossion (2001), Magnun, Hillyard, & Luck (1993) Hopf, Vo-
gel, Woodman, Heinze, & Luck (2002). We also expected to find effects of expectations on ERPs
locked to the gaze shifts of the observed agent. These ERPs were analyzed in the posterior lateral
regions (T7,T8, P7, P8, TP7, and TP8) in the time window of the N300 component (following
Senju et al., 2006, 2008, and Tipples et al., 2012)
We found that the behavioral results followed the same pattern as previously reported
(Perez-Osorio, et al, 2015): (1) faster target discrimination responses to targets at validly cued,
relative to invalidly cued, locations – the typical gaze-cueing effect; and (2) modulation of the
gaze-cueing effect by action expectation: an enhanced gaze-cueing effect when the actor gazed at
objects congruent, rather than incongruent or neutral, with respect to the action context. This
implies that participants’ expectations with regard to the gaze behavior displayed by the ob-
served agent modulated gaze following. In other words, gaze-cueing effects involve (at least to
some degree) a top-down component that modulates spatial-attentional orienting in response to
shifts of gaze direction.
Importantly, we found that the target-locked ERPs mirrored the behavioral results: larg-
er validity effects (increased amplitude in the occipital-temporal N1 component for validly cued
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locations vs. invalidly cued locations) in congruent, relative to incongruent, gaze conditions. In-
terestingly, modulatory effect was observed on the N1 component, N1 is thought to reflect per-
ceptual discrimination processes for stimuli at attended locations (Ritter, Simson, & Vaughan,
1983; Ritter, Simson, Vaughan, & Macht 1982; Senkowski & Hermann, 2002; Vogel & Luck,
2000; Fort, Besle, Giard, & Pemier, 2005; Luck & Hillyard, 1995; Mangun, 1995; Mangun &
Hillyard, 1991; Parasuraman, 1980). Previous studies have shown that a number of stimulus
properties can modulate N1 amplitudes (e.g.: color or shape: Vogel & Luck, 2000; task difficulty,
defined in terms of the similarity of the target to the distractors: Fedota, McDonald, Roberts, &
Parasuraman, 2012). This modulation has been interpreted in terms of an influence of top-down
control over early discrimination processes. Hence, in our paradigm – in which the top-down
influence originated in expectations about the forthcoming action sequence – the N1 effects par-
allel previous findings. Importantly, this is the first study that extends previous results to more
naturalistic, social situations. 
Furthermore, apart from the target-related ERP effects and behavioral results, we found
that the N300 component –locked to gaze-shift onset– yielded a more negative amplitude in the
incongruent condition relative to the congruent condition, which is consistent with Senju et al.
(2006) and Tipples et al. (2013). However, and importantly, our paradigm also included a base-
line (i.e., an action-neutral) condition. Our results showed that the incongruent condition did
not elicit an ERP amplitude significantly different from the neutral condition. Instead, it was the
congruent condition that yielded a (significantly) more positive ERP amplitude compared to the
neutral baseline. Accordingly, the difference between the incongruent and congruent conditions
(also reported by Senju et al., 2006, 2008; and Tipples et al., 2013) represents a more positive
amplitude related to congruent gaze, rather than an increased negativity related to incongruent
gaze. Hence, our findings support the notion that the modulation of the N300 component might
be better understood as a congruency-related positivity, rather than incongruency-related nega-
tivity, as proposed by Senju et al. (2006) and Tipples et al. (2013). Moreover, this effect pattern
is paralleled in our behavioral data, as the gaze-cueing effects were larger for the congruent con-
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dition, relative to both the incongruent and the neutral condition (the two latter did not differ
from each other).
The congruency-related positivity is perhaps best interpreted in line with attention-relat-
ed effects on the P1/N1 components in spatial cueing paradigms (Hillyard, Vogel, & Luck, 1998;
Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2000): the typical pattern of results (see Hillyard et al., 1998) is that
of an enhanced N1 for validly cued targets, relative to invalidly cued targets and neutral cueing
conditions. Participants in spatial cueing also expect a stimulus to appear at the cued location,
relative to other locations. Therefore, expected stimulus events yield more enhanced ampli-
tudes, relative to unexpected or neutral conditions. Similarly, in our study, the expected gaze
event yielded more enhanced amplitude, relative to the neutral and unexpected conditions.
Even though this difference was in the ‘negativity’ range, the more positive amplitude in the ex-
pected condition can be seen as enhanced amplitude, as this was the only condition that differed
from the neutral baseline. Moreover, both the behavioral effects and the target-locked ERPs
showed this as an enhancement of processing in the congruent condition (larger gaze-cueing ef-
fects for congruent vs. incongruent and neutral, and no difference between incongruent and
neutral). Hence, in the present study expectancy yielded a more positive amplitude of the N300
component, in accordance with attention-related studies showing also more enhanced ampli-
tudes for expected stimuli, relative to unexpected or neutral conditions.
It is plausible that the effect of gaze congruency (with respect to the action context) on
the N300 component is related to activation of STS, which has been found to be associated with
the processing of expectations (Sebanz et al., 2006; Tipples et al., 2013) and with observed gaze
shifts (Pelphrey et al., 2003, 2004, 2005; Senju et al., 2006, Tipples et al., 2013), as well as oth-
er types of (observed) biological motion (Hirai et al., 2005; Jokisch et al., 2005). Our results are
also in line with the proposed function of the STS, namely, the encoding of the relations between
perceived biological motion and environmental context (Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004;
Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004). Previous studies also indicate that the STS is
the main area of a network involved in understanding others’ intentions, deployment of antici-
patory mechanisms in action observation, and prediction of the successive action steps pro-
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duced by (observed) others (Frith & Frith, 2006). This area has been shown to be specialized in
processing of human non-verbal cues (for review, see Puce & Perrett, 2003), determining gaze
direction (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000), and detecting unexpected human body move-
ments (Grezes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2004; Morris, Pelphrey, & Mc-
Carthy, 2005; Saxe et al., 2004). In addition to the STS, the IPS (Pelphrey et al., 2003, 2005)
and the FFG (Pelphrey et al., 2003) have been reported to show larger activation in response to
object-incongruent gaze shifts. Thus, it is conceivable that IPS activation could also contribute
to the observed effects. Although one cannot draw conclusions regarding the neural sources of
the scalp-recorded EEG without performing source reconstruction analyses, it is probable that
the present effects are linked to the activity of the STS/IPS and FFG network.
Overall, the present study provides electrophysiological evidence in support of the idea
that gaze following can be modulated by expectations regarding (observed) gaze behavior within
the context of complex actions. Gaze following can be enhanced when the observed agent con-
firms expectations the observers have concerning where the agent would look next, given the ac-
tion the agent is performing. This finding is not only consistent with previous studies demon-
strating the impact of top-down control on gaze-cueing effects (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Kan-
wisher, 2000; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005; Bayliss, Schuch, & Tipper, 2010; Teufel et al., 2010;
Wiese, Wykowska et al., 2012; Wykowska, Wiese et al., 2014), but it also shows that gaze direc-
tion serves the purpose of informing others about (likely) forthcoming action steps towards
reaching the goal of the task (Flanagan & Johannson, 2003). In this context, our findings eluci-
date the functional role of the gaze following in naturalistic scenarios, while also revealing links
between higher-order cognition and lower-level social attention mechanisms. In detail, humans
do not simply (passively) observe others’ actions; rather, they (actively) generate predictions
about subsequent action steps, based on shared action schemata (Schubotz & von Cramon,
2002) and understanding of the underlying action goals.
In conclusion, the present study is the first to provide electrophysiological evidence for
the idea that expectations regarding others’ actions can modulate gaze-guided orientation of at-
tention. Confirmation, or violation of expectations concerning other’s actions can provide sig-
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nals for the top-down modulation of early sensory processing, as indexed by well-understood
ERP components. 
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4.1 Summary of results 
The goal of the presented PhD-project was to examine whether higher-order prediction
mechanisms of the human brain influence a fundamental process of social cognition, namely,
gaze following –or in other words, shared attention. In Experiments 1 and 2 We investigated
how attention to objects in a naturalistic scene is influenced by two factors: the (perceived) gaze
direction of an actor, and background expectations regarding the action context. Results across
experiments showed consistently (1) faster target discrimination responses to targets at validly
cued, relative to invalidly cued, locations –the typical gaze-cueing effect; and (2) modulation of
the gaze-cueing effect by action expectation: an enhanced gaze-cueing effect when the actor
gazed at objects congruent, rather than incongruent or neutral, with respect to the action con-
text. Additionally, we examined electrophysiological correlates of action-related modulation of
gaze cueing effect in Experiment 3 and found modulatory effects on the P1/N1 components
locked to the onset of a target; P1 was modulated by gaze validity with respect to target location,
and N1 was modulated both by gaze validity and participants’ expectations about where the
agent should gaze in order to perform an action. Furthermore, we also found that an ERP com-
ponent in the range of N300, locked to shift of gaze direction (before the target onset) was more
positive when gaze was congruent with the action sequence, relative to incongruent and neutral
conditions. Results in Experiment 3 add electrophysiological evidence to the notion that expec-
tations regarding others’ actions can modulate gaze-guided orientation of attention. Confirma-
tion or violation of expectations concerning other’s actions can provide signals for the top-down
modulation of early sensory processing, as indexed by well-understood ERP components. Col-
lectively, our findings suggest that participants’ expectations with regard to the gaze behavior
displayed by the observed agent modulated gaze following. In other words, gaze-cueing effects
involve (at least to some degree) a top-down component that modulates attentional orienting in
response to shifts of gaze direction. 
4.2 Gaze following is modulated by expectations about other’s behavior
The results of experiments presented in this thesis showed that task performance (i.e.,
discrimination of the liquid level in the target glass) depended on gaze cue validity with respect
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to the target side, with attention following the gaze direction of the observed agent (gaze cueing
effects). However, the gaze-cueing effects were modulated by whether the actor had gazed at an
action-congruent or an incongruent object: the cueing effects were significantly reduced (Exper-
iment 1), if not entirely eliminated (Experiment 2 and 3), when the actor gazed at objects incon-
gruent with action context, relative to congruent objects. The differential cueing effect between
the congruent and incongruent conditions was due to gaze following being enhanced when the
actor’s gaze was directed to the action-congruent object (the neutral and incongruent conditions
yielded smaller effects compared to the congruent condition, in all Experiments), and possibly
also suppression of gaze following, as evidenced by the non-significant cueing effect in the in-
congruent condition (as compared to significant effects in the neutral and congruent
conditions). The complete lack of a validity effect in the latter case would mean that participants
did not follow the actor’s gaze when she looked at an object that was action-incongruent, thus
demonstrating the potency of top-down control over bottom-up-driven orienting of attention in
response to gaze direction. 
Figure A5 represents the hypothesized dynamics of attentional deployment over the
course of an experimental trial. Upon presentation of the first image following the action con-
text, the observer would attend to the action-congruent object. Subsequently, they would follow
the observed agent’s gaze direction in the scene, which was corroborated by the significant main
effect of gaze cue validity. Finally, in the last photograph of the trial sequence, the observer’s at-
tention would be summoned to the target glass (filled with liquid to a certain level), as partici -
pants were required to discriminate the level of liquid in the target. Not surprisingly, the fastest
RTs were found when the observed agent’s gaze was directed to the congruent object and the re-
sponse was to be made to the same (target) object (A5, panel A) –that is, the condition in which
no attention shifts were required along the trial sequence. Conceivably, the congruent object be-
ing gazed-at by the actor in the scene confirmed and reinforced the observer’s prior expecta-
tions, strongly summoning attention to the action-congruent location. The costs related to gaze-
incongruent locations (A5 panel B) were minimal, relative to when the gaze was directed to-
wards action-congruent objects (A5 panel A). 
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Figure A5. The four main conditions of interest (neutral conditions not represented). The ac-
tion context selected for the example is “bring something to drink”. The rows in each panel represent suc-
cessive events in a trial sequence: the frst row depicts the presentation of the kitchen scene with two bottles on 
the opposite sides of the counter; the second row represents the gaze shift event, in which the actor directed her 
gaze to one of the two sides; fnally, the third row depicts the target event, in which the target (a flled glass) was 
presented. The fastest RTs were obtained in the congruent gaze, valid condition, in which the gaze was congruent 
with the context and gaze cue was valid (A). In the incongruent gaze, valid condition (B), the RTs were similar to 
gaze congruent valid. However, in the incongruent gaze, invalid condition (D), the RTs were increased relative to 
both conditions with valid gaze cues (A, B), indicative of gaze following. Importantly, the largest increase in RTs 
relative to the other conditions was observed for incongruent gaze, invalid trials (C), that is, the performance cost 
was largest when the gaze direction confrmed the initial expectations but the target appeared in the non-cued lo-
cation. The hypothetical focus of attention is represented by green circles and shifts of the attentional focus by ar-
rows. Arrows of different colors represent hypothesized shifts of attention, with darker colors (orange and red) 
representing temporal costs of attentional shifts between hemifelds.
By contrast, the longest RTs were elicited when the agent’s gaze was action-congruent
but did not validly cue the target location (Figure A5 panel C). In this condition, the initial as-
sumption of the observer, who would have anticipated the actor’s gaze to be directed to the ac-
tion-congruent object, was actually confirmed by the displayed gaze behavior. As a result, atten-
tion would have remained focused on the action-congruent and gazed-at object. Hence, when
the target did eventually appear on the opposite side, the observer’s expectations were violated
and a conflict ensued, as the observer was now to produce a response to an invalidly cued target
at an unexpected location. This elicited the largest cost in performance –larger RTs–, relative to
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the other conditions. In the incongruent-gaze and invalidly-cued-target condition (Figure A5
panel D), the actor’s gaze was violating the initial expectation already at the second step of the
trial sequence and the costs were smaller relative to when the initial expectations concerning
gaze direction were confirmed (A5 panel C). Moreover, in Experiment 2 and 3 when the actor’s
gaze was incongruent with the action context, no gaze-cueing effect was observed. That is, the
facilitation typically associated with gaze cues was diminished or eliminated when expectations
regarding which object would be gazed at (given the overarching action context) were violated.
Finally, the congruent gaze condition yielded stronger gaze-cueing effects relative to the neutral
action context baseline in all experiments. 
Our pattern of results is in line with previously observed ‘combined-expectancy’ effects
on selective attention in modality-cueing tasks, in which the response-critical target stimulus
varied across sensory modalities (Klein & Hansen, 1990; Kingstone & Klein, 1991; Kingstone,
1992; Mattler, 2003, 2005; Mattler, van der Lugt, & Munte, 2006). In typical modality cueing
tasks, participants are cued to expect a stimulus in a given modality (e.g., either vision or audi-
tion), with the task being to discriminate a stimulus defined within the (cued or uncued) target
modality (e.g., to make a two-alternative forced choice response either to the color of a square or
to the pitch of a tone). In a task combining response and modality expectancies (e.g., Mattler,
2005; Mattler et al., 2006), participants were asked to respond to either the color of the stimu-
lus or the pitch of a tone by pressing one of two keys with their left or their right hand (e.g., the
target might be a visual stimulus, in which case red color required manual response A and green
color response B; or the target might be an auditory stimulus, with a high-pitch stimulus requir-
ing manual response A and a low-pitch stimulus response B). Cues (valid or invalid) presented
before the target stimulus indicated the identity of the upcoming stimulus (e.g., “red” or “high”),
thus cueing both the modality of the target and the response required. The behavioral results
showed larger modality cueing effects (validly cued modality vs. invalidly cued modality) for
validly vs. invalidly cued responses. That is, when one of the expectations was confirmed (the
validly cued response), violation of the other expectancy (the invalidly cued modality) produced
a large impairment (relative to the validly cued modality). However, when both expectations
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were violated (invalidly cued response and invalidly cued modality), the impairment relative to
the validly cued modality was not as large. Our results show a similar pattern: the observed ac-
tor’s gaze violated the initial expectation regarding her gaze behavior (Figure 5D, second row),
violation of the expectation regarding the validity of her gaze with respect to the target object
produced a smaller impairment of performance (Figure 5D third row) relative to when the ini-
tial expectation was confirmed (Figure 5C, second row) and the later expectation violated (Fig-
ure 5C, third row). In a different experimental setup, Hommel (1998, 2004) reported a pattern
of results that resembles the present findings: under conditions in which the stimulus and re-
sponse features could independently change or repeat across trials, the largest impairment of
performance was observed when only one but not the other feature (stimulus or response)
changed across consecutive trials, in comparison with cases in which both features were either
repeated or changed (both stimulus and response were same or both different). Hommel (1998,
2004) attributed these ‘partial-repetition costs’ to competition between the stimulus-response
(S-R) mapping on the current trial and the S-R binding from the previous trial (stored in an
episodic ‘event file’), where the latter is activated, on the current trial, through repetition of one
of the features. Similar effects have been reported in inter-trial analyses of compound-search
tasks in which the search-critical and response-critical stimulus attributes varied randomly, and
independently, across consecutive trials (e.g., Töllner, Gramann, Kiss, Muller, & Eimer, 2008,
Zehetleitner, Rangelov, & Muller, 2012). Töllner et al. (2008) and Zehetleitner et al. (2012) ex-
plained their results in terms of ‘linked expectancies’ with regard to the search- and response-
critical attributes.
The most important implication of these results is that gaze cueing appeared to be mod-
ulated by participants’ expectations with regard to upcoming action steps in an observed action
sequence. In other words, relative to the baseline, the gaze-cueing effect was actually enhanced
when the actor’s gaze ‘complied’ with observers’ expectations regarding the object that would be
gazed at in order to achieve the ultimate action goal. That is, based on their background knowl-
edge of the social/action context, humans activate a certain action schema (Manthley et al.,
2003) and implicitly expect the gaze of the observed agent to precede (and, thus, provide a
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pointer to) successive action steps (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). Hence, when the observed
gaze behavior conflicts with participants’ expectations concerning the action sequence, they gaze
following seems to be overridden by top-down control. Since gaze cueing reflects mechanisms
underlying joint attention (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Sebanz et al., 2006) – which in turn
facilitates establishing common social context and/or is related to action understanding (Sebanz
et al., 2006) – the present results suggest that humans might be reluctant to engage in a com-
mon social context with those who violate their expectations regarding gaze behavior.
Our results can also be interpreted along the lines of Wurm and Schubotz (2012), who
performed a study using fMRI and behavioral measures to examine how action understanding is
affected by the compatibility of an action with a context in which it is embedded. Wurm and
Schubotz (2012) assumed that action sequences always unfold in a certain context, with given
objects and in a particular order. Participants watched video clips of context-specific everyday
actions performed in domestic settings and were to stop the video as soon as they had identified
the action. The actions were performed in a compatible, an incompatible, or a neutral context
(i.e. cutting bread in the kitchen, in the bathroom, or, in an empty white background, respec-
tively). The results revealed RTs to be slower (by 100 ms, on average) for the incompatible ver-
sus the compatible condition; no differences were reported between neutral and compatible
contexts. Likewise, BOLD responses showed an increased activation in the left ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex when the context was incompatible, relative to the other conditions. Wurm and
Schubotz (2012) concluded that the effects were driven by the conflict induced by incompatible
contexts, which might violate expectations –similar to the current study.
In sum, the present results confirm the idea that gaze-cueing effects can be influenced by
whether or not the gazed-at object fits with an overarching action scheme –which is in line with
previous findings showing top-down influences on the bottom-up gaze-cueing effect (e.g., Teufel
et al., 2010; Wiese et al., 2013; Wiese et al., 2012; Wykowska et al., 2014). However, going be-
yond previous findings, the present results show that the ‘referring’ function of the gaze cue crit-
ically depends on whether the referred-to object does or does not fit with a background action
context, yielding an interactive influence on the deployment of attention: when the agent’s gaze
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is action-congruent, the referring function of the gaze cue and thus the cueing effect is strength-
ened, whereas it is weakened when the gaze is action-incongruent.
4.3 Electrophysiological correlates of gaze cueing modulation
The present project examined also which stages of processing are influenced by expecta-
tions about others’ action steps –using the event-related potentials (ERPs) of the EEG signal.
Importantly we replicated the behavioral effect showing that gaze-cueing effects are modulated
by whether the observed agent gazed at an object which was expected to be gazed-at, according
to the action sequence. In addition to the behavioural effects, we found that validly cued loca-
tions elicited an increased amplitude in the occipital-temporal N1 component, relatively to in-
validly cued locations; but only in action-congruent gaze conditions. Extensive evidence suggest
that modulatory effects on N1 play a significant role in perceptual discrimination processes for
stimuli at attended locations (Ritter, Simson, & Vaughan, 1983; Ritter, Simson, Vaughan, &
Macht 1982; Senkowski & Hermann, 2002; Vogel & Luck, 2000; Fort, Besle, Giard, & Pemier,
2005; Luck & Hillyard, 1995; Mangun, 1995; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; Parasuraman, 1980).
Studies have shown that not only physical properties of the stimuli (e.g. color or shape, Vogel &
Luck, 2000), but also task difficulty (defined in terms of the similarity of the target to the dis -
tractors: Fedota, McDonald, Roberts, & Parasuraman, 2012) can modulate N1 amplitudes.
Hence, in our paradigm the top-down influence –generated by expectations about the forthcom-
ing action sequence– corresponds to N1 effects previously reported. Importantly, to the best of
our knowledge, these results reveal for the first time how such modulation unfolds in more nat-
uralistic, social contexts. 
Moreover, we found that the N300 component, locked to gaze-shift onset recorded in the
temporal occipital areas, was more negative in the incongruent condition relative to the congru-
ent condition. This is consistent with Senju et al. (2006, 2008) and Tipples et al. (2012) who
found that the same component yielded a more negative amplitude in response to breaches in
expectation of direction of eye/gaze cues. These studies suggest that incongruent conditions
elicit a more negative amplitude relative to congruent conditions. However, in contrast to Senju
and Tipples, our paradigm also included a baseline condition (i.e., an action-neutral condition).
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Our comparisons showed that the incongruent condition did not elicit an ERP amplitude signifi-
cantly different from the neutral condition. Conversely, our analyses revealed that it was the
congruent condition that yielded a (significantly) more positive ERP amplitude relative to neu-
tral baseline. Similarly, rather than an increased negativity related to incongruent gaze, the dif-
ference between the incongruent and congruent conditions represents a more positive ampli-
tude related to congruent gaze. Hence, we suggest that the modulation of the N300 component
might be better understood as a congruency-related positivity, rather than incongruency-related
negativity. It is plausible to assume that larger amplitudes on N300 reflect update of expecta-
tions regarding the unfolding action sequence. While, in the gaze congruent condition expecta-
tions were matched, in the other two conditions unmatched (incongruent) or not defined (neu-
tral) expectations required updates. Previous findings (Wolpert et al., 2003) suggest that mere
action observation elicits inferences regarding the intentions and goals of others. Consistently,
we assume that all conditions generated expectations regarding the observed agents’ behavior,
even in the neutral condition when the action goal was not specified. Therefore, more negative
amplitudes in N300 reveal not only detection of unexpected movements but as well might re-
flect update of expectations. This update regarding other’s behavior might provide signals for
the top-down modulation of early sensory processing. Additionally, observed N300 component
activation paralleled behavioral data, with significantly larger gaze-cueing effects for the congru-
ent condition, relative to both the incongruent and the neutral conditions –which showed no
difference.
Collectively, findings in Experiment 3 showed that modulation of gaze following by ex-
pectations occurs in early stages of processing. Namely, occipital components closely associated
with attention/discrimination can be affected by expectations regarding (observed) gaze behav-
ior within the context of complex actions. Furthermore, our findings suggest that update of ex-
pectations might play a role in modulation of early attentional components via top-down regula-
tion.
Our findings are consistent with previous studies that showed the impact of top-down
control on gaze-cueing effects (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Kanwisher, 2000; Ristic & Kingstone,
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2005; Bayliss, Schuch, & Tipper, 2010; Teufel et al., 2010; Wiese, Wykowska et al., 2012;
Wykowska, Wiese et al., 2014). Moreover, our findings reveal links between higher-order cogni-
tion and lower-level social attention mechanisms, unveiling the functional role of the gaze fol-
lowing in naturalistic scenarios. Hence, prior knowledge helps to understand the underlying ac-
tion goals of others’ behavior online, actively –rather than reactively. Importantly, these predic-
tions seem to impact earlier stages of information processing to the point of modulating deploy-
ment of attentional resources. 
The observed gaze congruency effects on N300 component might be related to activation
of STS (in line with Sebanz et al., (2006); Tipples et al. (2012). It presumably reflects a general
mechanism for detecting unexpected events and processing of expectations. Previous studies
also suggested that STS –together with the IPS (Pelphrey et al., 2003, 2005) and the FFG
(Pelphrey et al., 2003)– is part of a network involved in understanding others’ intentions, de-
ployment of anticipatory mechanisms in action observation, and prediction of the successive ac-
tion steps produced by (observed) others (Frith & Frith, 2006). Particularly, STS has been relat-
ed with the encoding of: biological motion (i.e. point-light displays of a walking person) (Hirai et
al., 2005; Jokisch et al., 2005), relations between perceived biological motion and context
(Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004), and ob-
served gaze shifts (Pelphrey et al., 2003, 2004, 2005; Senju et al., 2006, Tipples et al., 2013).
Therefore, it is plausible that the present effects are linked to the activity of the STS/IPS and
FFG network. However, these are only speculations regarding the sources of the observed EEG
signal, as one cannot draw firm based on scalp-recorded EEG without performing source recon-
struction analyses.
4.4 Theoretical implications
The present findings have several important theoretical implications. First, they add to
the mounting evidence that predictive processing is a ubiquitous mechanism of the human
brain, operating in various cognitive domains (including social cognition) at different levels –
from low-level perception (Friston, 2005) and motor control (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001),
through intermediate-level processes (Enns & Lleras, 2008) to higher-order cognition. Impor-
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tantly, our results provide clear evidence that even the higher-order prediction mechanisms af-
fect low-level fundamental processes (of social cognition, in the present case), thus supporting
the notion of highly interactive nature of processing in the brain, allowing for bi-directional in-
fluences across domains (Friston, 2005; Hommel et al., 2001).
Second, the present results confirm the idea that attentional orienting in response to
gaze cues, rather than being purely reflexive in nature (e.g., Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & King-
stone, 1998), is modifiable by top-down control processes (e.g., Teufel et al., 2010; Wiese et al.,
2012; Wykowska et al., 2014). Accordingly, our findings support the dual-component account of
gaze cueing recently proposed by Wiese et al. (2012), on which gaze cueing involves a (bot-
tom-up) mechanism of automatic attentional orienting to the gazed-at side, which may however
be modulated when additional, visual or social/action context information is available. Over and
above the previous evidence, the present findings show that top-down modulation of gaze-in-
duced attentional orienting can not only enhance gaze-cueing effects (as in the case of gaze be-
havior congruent with participants’ expectations) relative to baseline (default gaze following),
but also completely suppress the default mechanism (as in the case of gaze behavior incongru-
ent with expectations). 
Third, the results of this series of studies suggest that action prediction and gaze follow-
ing are closely connected. During social interaction, each counterpart needs to know what the
others are going to do next (Frith & Frith, 2006). Using gaze direction as informative about the
identity (What?) and the spatial location of attended objects (Where?); collecting prior knowl-
edge about the others’ preferences (Who?) –acquired by observation, direct interaction, or
through communication–, people are able to make inferences about others’ internal states
(Why?) and therefore, be able to predict the most likely upcoming actions under the given cir-
cumstances (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Thus, in our paradigm, knowing that the
observed agent was asked to bring a glass of orange juice to a guest, one would predict that she
would be looking for an empty glass and a bottle of orange juice (in order to pour some juice and
bring the filled glass to the guest). Therefore, through linking processing of gaze direction with
action prediction within a single paradigm, the current study clearly demonstrates that spatial
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information derived from gaze direction and context information about the action goal are com-
bined in order to predict consecutive steps in an action sequence. This demonstration highlights
the actual function of the gaze-following mechanism and the role it plays in natural daily-life
scenarios: gaze following has developed not only to pick up signals that others convey regarding
potentially relevant events in the environment, but also, and perhaps foremost, in order to en-
able us to infer what others are going to do next (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2006).
Finally, our findings have another important implication: they show that humans might
engage a mentalizing process (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2006) even if this is not
necessitated by the task. In our study, it was not necessary to infer the mental states of the ob-
served actor to complete the task. All that participants were required to do was to discriminate
the level of the liquid in the cup and keep in mind the first, action scenario image (for recall at
the end of the trial). Technically, it was a simple target discrimination task combined with a
short-term memory task. Yet, the data pattern shows that not only did participants (i) follow the
actor’s gaze, even though this was not relevant to any of the tasks (the gaze validity effect); but
they also (ii) engaged in a (perhaps implicit) mentalizing process involving predictions and ex-
pectations regarding where the actor would gaze in order to realize her action goal. The mental-
izing process was evidenced indirectly by the effect of gaze congruency on gaze following. If par-
ticipants had not mentalized about Ella’s action goals and intentions, they would not have had
any expectations regarding her gaze behavior; hence, violations of these expectations would not
have influenced the degree to which they followed Ella’s gaze. The effect of gaze congruency on
gaze validity cannot be explained by other factors, such as simple integration of background in-
formation about the context into the processing of the task-related information, as no effect of
target congruency was observed on gaze-neutral trials in Experiment 1. Had the effect been due
to the action context itself (rather than a process of mentalizing), we should have observed ef-
fects of context on target discrimination, and not the modulation of gaze cueing by gaze congru-
ency. Therefore, by eliciting an ‘automatic’ mentalizing process – be it theorizing about the ob-
served agent’s mental states, in accordance with the Theory-Theory of social cognition (see Ap-
perly, 2008), or by simulating her mental states through one’s own cognitive processes, in line
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with the Simulation Theory (see Apperly, 2008; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009) –our paradigm can
serve the purpose of probing mentalizing in an implicit (i.e., not necessarily explicit) manner.
This may be of particular relevance for research on autism spectrum disorder, as the affected in-
dividuals might actually be impaired in more implicit forms of social cognition, rather than ex-
plicit processes that are probed in typical theory-of-mind tasks (Schilbach et al., 2013).
4.5 Conclusions 
To conclude, the present series of studies is, to our knowledge, the first to provide the
missing link between the prediction mechanism involved in action understanding and (covert)
gaze following. With the use of a novel, naturalistic paradigm, we show that higher-order pre-
dictive processes modulate (either enhance or even entirely suppress) low-level mechanisms of
social cognition –gaze following– dependent on whether gaze direction of an observed agent is
in line or at variance with the expectations that participants hold with regard to the unfolding
action sequence. These findings support the idea that predictive processing is a ubiquitous
mechanism of the human brain operating in various cognitive domains (including social cogni-
tion) at several levels of the information processing hierarchy (from lower-lever predictive cod-
ing to higher-order cognitive predictions) and is potent enough to influence rudimentary and
fundamental low-level mechanisms, such as gaze following.
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• Emotional crisis telephone attention to police men and their families. 
Active listening and focus on costumer were necessary. As well participated
actively in design of the National Mental Health Policy, and the National 
Police's II Study of Mental Health in Colombia, as a co-researcher.
10.2008 – 06.2009 Psychosocial support - Construction of a clothing plant in Bogotá with demobilized 
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